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I. INTRODUCTION
With iPhone 5s, getting into your phone is faster and easier with
Touch ID—a new fingerprint identity sensor. Touch ID is a seamless
way to use your fingerprint as a passcode. With just the touch of the
Home button . . . the Touch ID sensor quickly reads your fingerprint
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and automatically unlocks your phone.1
When Apple announced that its then-latest version of the iPhone
would utilize a fingerprint scan instead of a traditional passcode to
unlock the phone, the media, consumers, and competitors went crazy.2
Of course, a fingerprint reader on your iPhone certainly seems exciting,
simpler, and safer. But does eliminating the need to enter a memorized
passcode to access the phone have any legal implications?
Consider the following hypothetical: A person is arrested. Officers
locate the suspect’s smartphone on him or her and want to search the
phone for text messages and photos relating to the illegal activity for
which the suspect was arrested. However, the suspect owns a
smartphone that utilizes a fingerprint reader to unlock the phone, and
unless the suspect puts his or her finger on the phone’s fingerprint
reader, the phone remains locked. The suspect either consents to the
search while being interrogated and places his or her finger on the phone
to unlock it, or the officers obtain a subpoena ordering the suspect to
unlock the phone. On the phone, officers find incriminating text
messages and photos that are used against the suspect at trial. Would this
constitute “compelled authentication,” violating the suspect’s Fifth
Amendment privilege to be free from self-incrimination?
The Fifth Amendment privilege is often overlooked and somewhat
misunderstood. “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.”3 The privilege is a basic constitutional
right that a person will likely never have to invoke or consider, until it is
too late.4 There are even differing opinions amongst legal professionals
regarding when the privilege applies.  For example, some argue that the
privilege applies strictly to self-incrimination at trial, and not to investi-
gations or interrogations.5 While the foregone conclusion doctrine seems
1. iPhone 5s: Using Touch ID, APPLE, http://support.apple.com/kb/HT5883 (last modified
May 6, 2014) [hereinafter Using Touch ID] (emphasis added).
2. See, e.g., Jeff Garnet, WSJ: New iPhone Really Will Have a Fingerprint Scanner, MAC
OBSERVER (Sept. 10, 2013, 10:52 AM), http://www.macobserver.com/tmo/article/wsj-new-
iphone-really-will-have-a-fingerprint-scanner (“Rumors have been circulating that one of the new
features will be a fingerprint sensor built into the Home button, and now the Wall Street Journal is
chiming in with its own version of ‘yep.’”).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. For example, an officer says to a suspect, “why don’t you tell me what happened and we
can hopefully clear up this whole thing.” Caught up in the pressure from the situation, locked
away in an investigation room, and not knowing what to do, the suspect starts talking and provides
incriminating evidence. Later on, the suspect realizes that he did not need to say anything and
could have simply invoked his Fifth Amendment right. See id. (“No person . . . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”); see also Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct.
2174, 2178 (2013) (explaining that the privilege against self-incrimination is not self-executing, so
a witness must expressly invoke the privilege to claim its protection).
5. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766 (2003) (disagreeing with the respondent that
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to clarify that when evidence is a “foregone conclusion” the privilege
does not apply, ambiguity remains regarding how to determine whether
evidence is in fact a “foregone conclusion.”6 Moreover, a circuit split
currently exists regarding whether compelled production of a password
or encrypted data violates the Fifth Amendment privilege.7 What is
clear, however, is that the privilege only applies to compelled informa-
tion that is of a testimonial or communicative nature.8 Thus, compelled
production or displays of purely physical characteristics do not violate
the Fifth Amendment’s privilege. But what exactly is a display of purely
physical characteristics?
Biometric authentication is the future of identification and security.
Biometrics Research Group, Inc., has estimated that “over 90 million
smartphones with biometric technology will be shipped in 2014.”9
Recent market research shows a compound annual growth rate of 19.8%
for biometric technologies.10 Biometric authentication is popping up
everywhere; airports,11 amusement parks,12 and even school districts are
jumping on board.13 Not surprisingly, there is a multitude of scholarly
publications available regarding biometric authentication and Fourth
police interrogation without actual charges being filed constituted a “criminal case”); cf. Thomas
Y. Davies, Farther and Farther from the Original Fifth Amendment: The Recharacterization of
the Right Against Self-Incrimination as a “Trial Right” in Chavez v. Martinez, 70 TENN. L. REV.
987 (2003) (discussing whether the Fifth Amendment is only a trial right).
6. See discussion infra Part II.B.
7. See discussion infra Part III.B.
8. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 219 (1988) (signing a consent form to release
records was not compelled testimony); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222–23 (1967)
(compelled speech merely to produce a voice sample did not violate the privilege); Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263, 266–67 (1967) (a handwriting exemplar did not violate the privilege);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (taking a blood sample for a blood analysis
was not compulsion); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 (1910) (compelled blouse
modeling did not violate the privilege).
9. Rawlson King, Mobile Commerce Will Drive Millions of Biometric Smartphone
Shipments, Billions in Transactions, BIOMETRICUPDATE.COM (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.
biometricupdate.com/201309/mobile-commerce-will-drive-millions-of-biometric-smartphone-
shipments-billions-in-transactions.
10. Biometrics: Technologies and Global Markets, BCC RESEARCH (Jan. 2014), http://www.
bccresearch.com/market-research/information-technology/biometrics-technologies-ift042d.html.
11. About Global Entry, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, http://www.globalentry.gov/
about.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2014) (“At airports, program participants . . . present their . . .
passport or U.S. permanent resident card, place their fingertips on the scanner for fingerprint
verification, and make a customs declaration.”).
12. See Finger Scanning at Theme Parks, FOX 35 NEWS ORLANDO (May 9, 2012), http://
www.myfoxorlando.com/story/18248551/finger-scanning-at-theme-parks (discussing the use of
finger scanners to access parks at Walt Disney World, Universal Studios, and SeaWorld).
13. See Kathleen McGrory, Lawmakers to Consider Banning Biometrics in Schools,
MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 2, 2014), http://www.miamiherald.com/2014/02/02/3909538/lawmakers-to-
consider-banning.html (discussing how some Florida schools use fingerprint scanners or palm
scanners in their cafeterias, which resulted in proposed laws banning the collection of biometric
information by school districts); see also H.R. 195, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014) (House bill
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Amendment privacy rights, such as tracking known or suspected
criminals using facial recognition technology or deoxyribonucleic acid
(“DNA”) databanks.14 Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United Sates
recently considered DNA analysis and concluded that DNA identifica-
tion is like fingerprinting and photographing for identification and does
not violate the Fourth Amendment.15
Nonetheless, scholars have warned about the implications of bio-
metrics on the Fourth Amendment: “While emerging biometric identifi-
cation technology, such as iris scanning and fac[ial] recognition
technology, may be a fast, cutting-edge way for law enforcement to keep
track of convicted felons and suspected terrorists, the government should
not be allowed to unreasonably intrude on individual privacy rights
under the Fourth Amendment.”16 Likewise, the government should not
be able to circumvent an individual’s Fifth Amendment privilege to be
free from self-incrimination through the use of biometric authentication.
However, there has been considerably less conversation regarding bio-
metric authentication’s impact on the Fifth Amendment than there has
been regarding its impact on the Fourth Amendment.17
This article analyzes whether biometric authentication implicates
the Fifth Amendment privilege to be free from self-incrimination. First,
to regulate the use of biometrics in schools); S. 232, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014) (Senate bill
to prohibit a school district from collecting students’ biometric information).
14. See, e.g., Rudy Ng, Catching Up to Our Biometric Future: Fourth Amendment Privacy
Rights and Biometric Identification Technology, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 425 (2006)
(discussing biometric authentication and the Fourth Amendment).
15. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
16. Ng, supra note 14, at 442; cf. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979 (“[S]cience can always progress
further, and those progressions may have Fourth Amendment consequences . . . .”). In King, the
Supreme Court acknowledged, “a significant government interest does not alone suffice to justify
a search. The government interest must outweigh the degree to which the search invades an
individual’s legitimate exceptions of privacy.” Id. at 1977–78. However, the “expectations of
privacy of an individual taken into police custody ‘necessarily [are] of a diminished scope.’” Id. at
1978 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979)).
17. Most discussion regarding the Fifth Amendment and compelled production involves
traditional passcode authentication where the user needs to input a passcode committed to
memory. See, e.g., Erica Fruiterman, Upgrading the Fifth Amendment: New Standards for
Protecting Encryption Passwords, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 655 (2013); John E. D. Larkin, Compelled
Production of Encrypted Data, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 253 (2012). Biometric
authentication’s impact on the Fifth Amendment is just now becoming a topic of conversation. See
Marcia Hoffman, Apple’s Fingerprint ID May Mean You Can’t ‘Take the Fifth’, WIRED (Sept. 12,
2013, 9:29 AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/09/the-unexpected-result-of-fingerprint-
authentication-that-you-cant-take-the-fifth/ (discussing how the privilege to be free from self-
incrimination “may not apply when it comes to biometric-based fingerprints (things that reflect
who we are) as opposed to memory-based passwords and PINs (things we need to know and
remember)”); Chet Kaufman, Encrypting Data May Give Rise to a Limited Constitutional
Defense, 37 CHAMPION 36, 41 (2013) (biometrics involve physical acts that fall outside the Fifth
Amendment’s protection, so defendants cannot argue that a biometric act compels them to
produce the contents of their minds). Nonetheless, this topic has been relatively unexplored.
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Part II reviews the history of the Fifth Amendment privilege, including
the foregone conclusion doctrine, and discusses the interplay between
the search incident to arrest doctrine and the Fifth Amendment. Second,
Part III provides an overview of encryption and the current circuit split
regarding whether the Fifth Amendment prohibits compelled production
of passwords and encrypted data. Third, Part IV presents an overview of
biometric authentication and discusses how the “Biometric Revolu-
tion”18 impacts our everyday lives. Finally, Part V analyzes biometric
authentication’s impact on the Fifth Amendment, suggesting that bio-
metric authentication will not implicate the privilege to be free from
self-incrimination, and discusses the consequences that this may have on
an individual’s constitutional rights.
II. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. The Privilege to Be Free from Self-Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
the privilege to be free from self-incrimination, stating that “[n]o person
. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.”19 The fundamental purpose of the Fifth Amendment is to pre-
serve “an adversary system of criminal justice.”20 “That system is under-
mined when a government deliberately seeks to avoid the burdens of
independent investigation by compelling self-incriminating disclo-
sures.”21 Over time, however, the original meaning and purpose of this
right has become somewhat unclear, often even referred to as “murky”
or “confused.”22
James Madison’s proposed Bill of Rights contained a miscella-
neous article—including his version of the self-incrimination clause—
that appeared within the procedural rights the accused was to be
afforded at trial.23 However, Madison failed to explain how broadly he
intended the self-incrimination clause to apply.24 Nonetheless, the pro-
posal appeared to apply to both civil and criminal cases and to any stage
of legal investigation or inquiry.25 Upon review, the House of Repre-
18. For purposes of this article, the growing prevalence of biometric authentication in
consumer personal electronic devices, such as smartphones, tablets, and laptops, will be referred
to as the “Biometric Revolution.”
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976).
21. Id. at 655–56.
22. See Davies, supra note 5, at 998.
23. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION 422–23 (Oxford Univ. Press 1968).
24. See id. at 423.
25. See id. In framing-era practice, defendants were viewed as interested witnesses and could
not even testify as witnesses in their own trials under the rules of evidence in place at the time. See
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sentatives amended the article, confining it to criminal cases, and unani-
mously adopted the amended article.26 The Senate later accepted the
self-incrimination clause, rephrased the double jeopardy clause, and
added a clause on the grand jury, creating today’s version of the Fifth
Amendment.27 The Senate then grouped together the accused’s proce-
dural rights afforded after indictment, creating the Sixth Amendment.28
The location of the self-incrimination clause in the Fifth Amendment
rather than the Sixth provides that the Senate, like the House, did not
intend to restrict that clause to the criminal defendant only nor only to
his trial. The Fifth Amendment, even with the self-incrimination
clause restricted to criminal cases, still put its principle broadly
enough to apply to witnesses and to any phase of the proceedings.29
An early consideration of this self-incrimination clause occurred in
Bram v. United States, where the government offered a conversation
between a detective and shipmate regarding a murder aboard the vessel
into evidence as a confession.30 Notably, the Supreme Court explained
that a mere confession made to a police officer while the accused was
under arrest is not enough to render the confession involuntary; instead,
the facts and circumstances surrounding the confession must be consid-
ered to determine whether the confession was in fact “compelled” under
the Fifth Amendment.31 Over time, the premise became clear—the
accused cannot be compelled to incriminate himself.32 This privilege is
fulfilled “only when the person is guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.’”33
In the landmark custodial interrogation case, Miranda v. Arizona, the
Supreme Court stated,
[w]e are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the privilege
apply to informal compulsion exerted by law enforcement officers
Davies, supra note 5, at 999 (citing JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL
TRIAL 38 (2003)).
26. See LEVY, supra note 23, at 424–25. However, the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination
privilege can still be asserted in non-criminal cases where the answers might incriminate the
speaker in future criminal proceedings. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770 (2003) (citations
omitted). Nonetheless, “a violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination occurs
only if one has been compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case.” Id.
27. See LEVY, supra note 23, at 426–27.
28. See id. at 427.
29. Id. (emphasis added); see also R. H. HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 2 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1997) (“The
privilege . . . may be invoked . . . also by those who might be tried at some time in the
future. . . . [T]he privilege extends beyond the courtroom and the interrogation room of the police
station.”).
30. 168 U.S. 532, 534–40 (1897).
31. Id. at 558, 561 (citations omitted).
32. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
33. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (quoting Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8).
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during in-custody questioning. An individual swept from familiar
surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces,
and subjected to the techniques of persuasion . . . cannot be otherwise
than under compulsion to speak. As a practical matter, the compul-
sion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be
greater than in courts or other official investigations, where there are
often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery.34
Although the privilege was historically accorded a liberal construc-
tion,35 once defendants attempted to expand the privilege’s reach, the
Supreme Court had to carve out a line of distinction. Specifically, the
Supreme Court eventually clarified that “the privilege is a bar against
compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but . . . compulsion which
makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’
does not violate it.”36
For example, in Holt v. United States, the Supreme Court rejected
an argument that compelling an accused to put on and model a blouse
violated the privilege.37 Later, in Schmerber v. California, the Supreme
Court held, “the privilege protects an accused only from being com-
pelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evi-
dence of a testimonial or communicative nature,” and determined that a
blood sample taken from the petitioner was not “compulsion” in that
sense.38 The Supreme Court noted that “[t]he prohibition of compelling
a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition
of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be
material.”39 Thus, even though the petitioner was required to submit to a
blood test that revealed an incriminating piece of evidence, the evidence
was not “testimony [ ]or evidence relating to some communicative act or
writing by the petitioner . . . .”40
However, Justice Black starkly dissented from the majority’s view-
point in Schmerber:
In the first place it seems to me that the compulsory extraction of
34. Id. at 461 (explaining why the privilege against self-incrimination is fully applicable
during a period of custodial interrogation).
35. See id. (“In this Court, the privilege has consistently been accorded a liberal
construction.”).
36. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
37. 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 (1910).
38. 384 U.S. at 761. A police officer directed a physician to withdraw a blood sample from
the petitioner’s body while the petitioner was at the hospital receiving treatment for injuries
suffered in an automobile accident. Id. at 758. An analysis of the blood sample later revealed that
the petitioner was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Id. at 759.
39. Id. at 763 (quoting Holt, 218 U.S. at 252–53).
40. Id. at 765.
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petitioner’s blood for analysis so that the person who analyzed it
could give evidence to convict him had both a “testimonial” and a
“communicative nature.” The sole purpose of this project which
proved to be successful was to obtain “testimony” from some person
to prove that petitioner had alcohol in his blood at the time he was
arrested. And the purpose of the project was certainly “communica-
tive” in that the analysis of the blood was to supply information to
enable a witness to communicate to the court and jury that petitioner
was more or less drunk. I think it unfortunate that the Court rests so
heavily for its very restrictive reading of the Fifth Amendment’s priv-
ilege against self-incrimination on the words “testimonial” and “com-
municative.” These words are not models of clarity and precision as
the Court’s rather labored explication shows. Nor can the Court, so
far as I know, find precedent in the former opinions of this Court for
using these particular words to limit the scope of the Fifth Amend-
ment’s protection.41
Nonetheless, the majority agreed that the privilege generally “offers
no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting,
photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to
appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a
particular gesture.”42 However, the majority did admit that a test that
obtains physical evidence could still be “testimonial” if the test reveals
physiological responses, such as a lie detector test that measures changes
in body function during interrogation.43
A year after Schmerber, the Supreme Court further restricted the
meaning of “testimonial” in United States v. Wade.44 In Wade, the
Supreme Court considered a situation in which the government com-
pelled the petitioner to stand in a lineup wearing strips of tape similar to
those worn by a bank robber and to speak the words uttered by the bank
robber.45 Explaining that this was “compulsion of the accused to exhibit
his physical characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any knowledge
he might have,” the Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s argument
that his privilege against self-incrimination had been violated.46 Wade
further clarified that even compelled speech is not “testimonial” in
nature if the speech is to be used solely as an identifying physical char-
acteristic and not to admit guilt.47 Likewise, the taking of a handwriting
41. Id. at 774 (Black, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 764.
43. Id.
44. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
45. Id. at 220.
46. Id. at 222. However, the Supreme Court emphasized that the case at hand did not present
the question of admissibility in evidence of anything the petitioner did or said at the lineup. Id. at
223.
47. Id. at 222–23 (“[C]ompelling Wade to speak within hearing distance of the witnesses,
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exemplar does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination when
used solely as an identifying physical characteristic and not as evidence
of the content of what is written.48
Similarly, a consent directive signed by an accused does not violate
the privilege, provided the directive is nontestimonial in nature.49 In Doe
v. United States, the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas denied a motion to compel the defendant to sign forms
consenting to a disclosure of bank records, reasoning that “by signing
the consent forms [the accused] would necessarily be admitting the exis-
tence of the accounts,” and that if the banks then produced the records, it
would equate to an admission that the accused exercised authority over
the accounts and their potentially incriminating documents.50 On certio-
rari, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the execution of the form
would be compelled and that its execution might have an incriminating
effect, but emphasized that the question was “whether the act of execut-
ing the form [wa]s a ‘testimonial communication.’”51 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court determined that the consent directive did not have testi-
monial significance because executing the form was not an assertion of
fact; the only fact that would be revealed if the banks produced the
records would be that the bank believed the accounts belonged to the
accused.52 Notably, Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that if the accused
could “be compelled to use his mind to assist the Government in devel-
oping its case . . . he w[ould] be forced ‘to be a witness against him-
self,’” in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege to be free from
even to utter words purportedly uttered by the robber, was not compulsion to utter statements of a
‘testimonial’ nature; he was required to use his voice as an identifying physical characteristic, not
to speak his guilt.”).
48. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266–67 (1967). Some states’ criminal procedure
discovery rules explicitly outline similar permissible nontestimonial identification methods. E.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 3.220(c)(1) (West 2013); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-262(f) (West
2013). See also Maryland v. King, upholding the taking and analysis of DNA after a defendant’s
arrest, but before conviction, as a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment because DNA
analysis is an identification method and part of the routine booking procedure. 133 S. Ct. 1958,
1980 (2013).
49. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 219 (1988). The “consent directive” in Doe was a
form prepared by the Government that effectively rendered consent from the petitioner to have
twelve foreign banks release records related to certain account numbers that the Government knew
or suspected the petitioner had control over. Id. at 203.
50. Id. at 203–04. The district court noted that the petitioner’s “signing of the forms might
provide the Government with the incriminating link necessary to obtain an indictment, the kind of
‘fishing expedition’ that the Fifth Amendment was designed to prevent.” Id. at 204. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the form did not have
testimonial significance so the petitioner could not assert his Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at
205.
51. Id. at 207.
52. Id. at 215–18.
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self-incrimination.53 Nevertheless, the majority had spoken, and the
privilege’s limits seemed clear: to violate the privilege, the compelled
information had to be a factual assertion that was testimonial in nature.54
While the privilege’s contours finally seemed clear, in 2003, the
murkiness resurfaced with the Supreme Court’s decision in Chavez v.
Martinez.55 Interestingly, the respondent in Chavez asserted—in a civil
rights claim—that his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion had been violated during previous police questioning, even though
he was never charged with a crime or had his statements used against
him in a criminal case.56 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the
respondent’s Fifth Amendment privilege had not been violated because
he was never prosecuted for a crime, nor were his statements admitted
against him in a criminal case.57 The Supreme Court disagreed with the
respondent’s assertion that police interrogations alone constituted a
“criminal case” and explained that “a ‘criminal case’ at the very least
requires the initiation of legal proceedings.”58 While the Chavez deci-
sion seems relatively clear in that eliciting statements during police
questioning does not violate the privilege if the statements are never
used against the speaker in a criminal proceeding,59 subsequent legal
analysis by some scholars suggests that the Chavez opinion restricts the
privilege strictly to self-incrimination at trial.60
B. The Foregone Conclusion Doctrine’s Limiting Effect
The foregone conclusion doctrine61 removes the Fifth Amend-
53. Id. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. See id. at 215 (“We agree with the Court of Appeals that it would not [have testimonial
significance], because neither the form, nor its execution, communicates any factual assertions,
implicit or explicit, or conveys any information to the Government.”).
55. 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
56. Id. at 764–65. During questioning the respondent had admitted to taking a gun from a
police officer and pointing it at the officer and to regularly using heroin. Id. at 764.
57. Id. at 766–67.
58. Id. at 766.
59. Id. at 767 (“Here [the respondent] was never made to be a ‘witness’ against himself in
violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause because his statements were never
admitted as testimony against him in a criminal case.”).
60. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 5, at 988 (“According to the positions taken by six Justices in
Chavez, the core right protected by the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause consists
merely of prohibiting the introduction of compelled statements or of derivative ‘fruits’ of such
statements at a person’s criminal trial . . . .”). The Supreme Court also recently re-visited the
privilege in Salinas v. Texas, where it clarified that an accused must expressly invoke the
privilege; the accused cannot merely stand silent and later claim that the government violated his
privilege. 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013).
61. Lower courts and commentators have coined the term “foregone conclusion doctrine.”
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2012)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s explanation that the documents were a foregone conclusion in
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ment’s protection from the act of producing the requested information or
evidence if the government knows about the existence and location of
the evidence.62 Although producing information generally has a testimo-
nial aspect, if the government can show that it had “prior knowledge of
the existence, possession, and authenticity” of the information, the testi-
monial information becomes a “foregone conclusion.”63 Once the infor-
mation is a foregone conclusion, compelled production no longer
violates the Fifth Amendment.64
This doctrine first appeared in Fisher v. United States, where the
Supreme Court held that a taxpayer’s production of an accountant’s doc-
uments would not constitute incriminating testimony,65 because the exis-
tence and location of the papers were a “foregone conclusion,” and the
taxpayer would not add anything to the government’s case by merely
admitting to having the papers.66 The Fifth Amendment is limited to
situations in which a person is compelled to be a witness against himself
in a criminal case by extorting information from that person.67 In Fisher,
however, the government was not extorting anything from the accused.68
“A party is privileged from producing evidence but not from its produc-
tion,” and, in Fisher, the accused taxpayer was not compelled to testify
against himself, or even to produce the papers.69 Further, even if the
taxpayer had been subpoenaed to produce the documents, production
would not violate the privilege against self-incrimination because the
taxpayer did not prepare the documents, and the documents did not con-
tain testimonial declarations by the taxpayer.70 Ultimately, Fisher clari-
fied that the privilege only applies to testimonial assertions by the
accused, and the accused can nevertheless be compelled to produce
incriminating evidence that is not testimonial in nature.71
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976), noting that “[t]his explanation became known
as the ‘foregone conclusion’ doctrine”).
62. See, e.g., Bret E. Rasner, International Travelers Beware: No Reasonable Suspicion
Needed to Search Your Electronic Storage Devices at the Border, 3 PHOENIX L. REV. 669, 695
(2010) (“The foregone conclusion doctrine can remove the Fifth Amendment protection from the
act of production if the government already knows of the item and its whereabouts and obtaining
it does not add to its case.”).
63. Fruiterman, supra note 17, at 658.
64. Kenneth J. Melilli, Act-of-Production Immunity, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 236 (citing Fisher,
425 U.S. at 411) (“According to the Fisher Court, where the relevant testimonial component—
existence, possession, or authentication—is a ‘foregone conclusion,’ then the testimonial aspect of
the act of production is not protected by the fifth amendment.”).
65. 425 U.S. at 414.
66. See id. at 411 (citation omitted).
67. See id. at 398.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 398–99 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913)).
70. Id. at 409–11.
71. Id. at 410–11.
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Later, United States v. Hubbell limited the doctrine, although no
specific contours were defined.72 In Hubbell, the respondent invoked his
Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to comply with a subpoena
ordering him to produce documents.73 The Supreme Court explained
that the act of producing the documents might have a compelled testimo-
nial aspect because production would assert that the accused had control
over the documents, and the accused could then be compelled to testify
that all documents requested by the subpoena had been produced.74
Moreover, because the privilege against self-incrimination also includes
compelled statements that lead to incriminating evidence, even though
the statements themselves were not incriminating,75 the breadth of the
documents requested was “tantamount to answering a series of interrog-
atories” that could lead to incriminating evidence.76 Hubbell was unlike
Fisher’s foregone conclusion because the government did not show that
it had any specific knowledge of the papers or their location;77 instead,
the respondent would have had to use the contents of his own mind to
identify all the documents the subpoena requested.78 Although clarifying
that the scope of the foregone conclusion doctrine did not extend to
overbroad foregone conclusions—like a businessman possessing general
business records to justify compelled production of a broad range of
business documents—Hubbell failed to resolve the standard by which a
“foregone conclusion” should be measured.79
C. The Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine’s Effect on the
Fifth Amendment
As will be discussed in Part V.B, the search incident to arrest doc-
trine may affect the Fifth Amendment based on the ability of law
enforcement to retrieve incriminating evidence from the search of an
arrestee’s cell phone or computer. Evolving from Chimel v. California80
72. 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
73. Id. at 31.
74. See id. at 36–37.
75. See id. at 38 (citing Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 208 n.6 (1988)); see also
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (“The privilege afforded not only extends to
answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but
likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute
the claimant for a federal crime.”).
76. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 41–42.
77. See id. at 44–45.
78. See id. at 43. The Supreme Court compared the assembly of the documents requested by
the subpoena to verbally revealing the combination to a safe instead of “being forced to surrender
the key to a strongbox.” Id. (citing Doe, 487 U.S. at 210 n.9).
79. See Kaufman, supra note 17, at 37–38.
80. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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and United States v. Robinson,81 the doctrine later expanded to cover
cell phones82 but was recently restricted by the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Riley v. California.83
In Chimel, the Supreme Court held that police officers may search
an arrestee’s person and the area within his immediate control for weap-
ons and evidence that could easily be destroyed or concealed following
the arrest.84 Several years later, in Robinson, the Supreme Court
expanded the doctrine to allow searches of closed containers found on
the arrestee’s person during the search incident to arrest, even without
suspicion of illegal contents in the containers.85 Then in 2007, in United
States v. Finley, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
upheld the warrantless search of cell phones incident to arrest, noting
that police can look for evidence on the arrestee’s person,86 and that the
search extends to containers found on the arrestee’s person.87
The cell phone issue finally reached the Supreme Court in Riley,
where the Supreme Court acknowledged that the search incident to
arrest doctrine “has been recognized for a century,” but noted that “its
scope has been debated for nearly as long.”88 Putting an end to that
debate, the Supreme Court held that, generally, police may not search an
arrestee’s cell phone incident to a lawful arrest without first obtaining a
search warrant.89 Noting how “modern cell phones . . . are now such a
pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from
Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anat-
omy,” the Supreme Court explained that today’s cell phones “are based
on technology nearly inconceivable just a few decades ago when Chimel
and Robinson were decided.”90 The Supreme Court analyzed the two
concerns addressed in Chimel—harm to officers and destruction of evi-
dence—and determined that cell phones do not present the same con-
cerns as the area within an arrestee’s immediate control.91 Further, due
81. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
82. United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007).
83. No. 13-132, slip op. at 6 (U.S. June 25, 2014).
84. 395 U.S. at 763.
85. 414 U.S. at 235–36.
86. 477 F.3d at 259–60 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 233–34).
87. See id. at 260 (citing United States v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1988)). Like
Finley, many other courts that confronted the issue also found a warrantless search of a cell phone
found on the arrestee’s person to be lawful under the search incident to arrest doctrine. See, e.g.,
United States v. Grooms, No. 2:10-CR-87, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10824, at *3–5 (E.D. Tenn.
Jan. 3, 2011), United States v. Santillian, 571 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1102–03 (D. Ariz. 2008).
88. No. 13-132, slip op. at 6.
89. See id. at 28.
90. Id. at 9.
91. See id. (“On the government interest side, Robinson concluded that the two risks
identified in Chimel—harm to officers and destruction of evidence—are present in all custodial
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to the vast quantity of personal information modern cell phones hold, the
Supreme Court explained that cell phones are different from other physi-
cal objects that can be kept on an arrestee’s person.92 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court noted that officers can still search a cell phone incident
to an arrest after obtaining a search warrant, and that exigent circum-
stances “may still justify a warrantless search . . . .”93
In addition to exigent circumstances that may justify a warrantless
search, police can still obtain consent to search the arrestee’s phone
without a warrant.94 Regardless of whether the arrestee consents to a
warrantless search or police obtain a warrant, having a passcode on the
phone further complicates the situation and has the potential to “shift the
legal issues into more complicated Fourth and Fifth Amendment
territory.”95
If an arrestee has a passcode on the phone, police will have to ask
for the passcode to unlock the phone, arguably constituting interroga-
tion.96 The hallmark interrogation case, Miranda v. Arizona, specified
arrests. There are no comparable risks when the search is of digital data.”). First, digital data is not
a weapon that can be used to harm a police officer or used to help the arrestee escape. Id. at 10.
Second, “once law enforcement officers have secured a cell phone, there is no longer any risk that
the arrestee himself will be able to delete incriminating data from the phone.” Id. at 12. While the
government expressed concerns about remote data wiping and phones being protected by
unbreakable encryption once the phone locks, the Supreme Court declined to consider those
concerns significant or prevalent enough to permit a warrantless search. See id. at 13. The
Supreme Court also explained that officers likely have little time to search a cell phone at the
scene of the crime anyway, so third parties would still have significant time to remotely wipe data.
Id. at 14. Meanwhile, officers can just disconnect the phone from the network to prevent the
possibility of data being wiped from the phone. Id. Additionally, the phone would likely lock
anyway before an officer could search the phone. Id.
92. Id. at 17–19 (“First, a cell phone collects in one place many distinct types of
information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video—that reveal much more
in combination than any isolated record. Second, a cell phone’s capacity allows even just one type
of information to convey far more than previously possible. The sum of an individual’s private life
can be reconstructed through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and
descriptions; the same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet.
Third, the data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the phone or even earlier. . . . Finally,
there is an element of pervasiveness that characterizes cell phones but not physical records. Prior
to the digital age, people did not typically carry a cache of sensitive personal information with
them as they went about their day.”).
93. Id. at 25–26 (“Such exigencies could include the need to prevent the imminent destruction
of evidence in individual cases, to pursue a fleeing suspect, and to assist persons who are seriously
injured or are threatened with imminent injury.”).
94. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“[O]ne of the
specifically established exceptions to the [Fourth Amendment’s] requirements of both a warrant
and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”).
95. Adam M. Gershowitz, Password Protected? Can a Password Save Your Cell Phone from
a Search Incident to Arrest?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1144 (2011).
96. See id. at 1166. Consider the case of People v. Rangel, where officers searched a suspect’s
house pursuant to a valid search warrant authorizing the seizure of items that constitute “gang
indicia,” and found a smartphone that had been next to the suspect when they entered his room.
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that procedural safeguards must be provided prior to custodial interroga-
tion that secure the privilege against self-incrimination.97 The Supreme
Court defined custodial interrogation as “questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or other-
wise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”98 How-
ever, the Supreme Court has also held that a violation of the Miranda
rule does not require suppression of physical evidence obtained as a
result of the violation.99 Thus, as Professor Adam Gershowitz suggests,
“[i]f police obtain an arrestee’s password in violation of Miranda, an
officer’s statement conceding knowledge of the password will be inad-
missible, but any valuable resulting evidence—for instance incriminat-
ing text messages . . . found on the phone—will be admissible.”100
Additionally, police and prosecutors may rely on a subpoena to either
compel production of the password or to compel production of
encrypted data.101 The subpoena has typically been the preferred means
of compulsion because it is less intrusive than a search, involves no
entry, and avoids most Fourth Amendment concerns.102
206 Cal. App. 4th 1310, 1313 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). Police read the suspect his Miranda rights and
the suspect agreed to speak with a detective. Id. When the detective asked the suspect for his
girlfriend’s name and phone number, the suspect replied that it was in his phone, and he (the
suspect) would have to look it up. Id. at 1313–14. The detective then asked, “[d]o you give me
permission to look in your phone so I can get her phone number,” to which the suspect responded,
“[t]here’s personal stuff in there. If you want I can call her and tell her.” Id. at 1314. Not
surprisingly the detective responded, “[i]t helps more if I can do it. You know what I mean? Then
it makes it look, you know, a little more forthcoming.” Id. The detective then asked again if he
could look in the suspect’s phone, and the suspect said yes but did not tell the detective that he
could only look in the contact or directory section of the phone. Id. After the interview, the
detective retrieved the suspect’s smartphone and read the file of text messages between the
suspect and his girlfriend, some of which appeared to link the suspect to the alleged crime. Id. The
court later denied a motion to suppress the text messages because they had been retrieved with a
valid search warrant for “gang indicia,” and a smartphone is an item that could logically contain
“gang indicia” in the form of text messages and directories. Id. at 1316–17. Although Rangel
concerns the Fourth Amendment, it is an example of the interrogation setting in which a suspect
waives his Miranda rights, begins talking, and is ultimately persuaded into allowing the detective
to search his smartphone for incriminating evidence that is later used against him at trial.
97. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
98. Id.
99. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636–37 (2004) (declining to extend the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine to the Miranda rule, holding that the self-incrimination clause “is not
implicated by the admission into evidence of the physical fruit of a voluntary statement”).
100. Gershowitz, supra note 95, at 1168. Professor Gershowitz suggests that even if police
demand a passcode, instead of merely requesting it, police likely still have not “compelled an
arrestee to incriminate himself with a testimonial response in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s
protection against self-incrimination.” Id.
101. See Larkin, supra note 17, at 263, 278.
102. See, e.g., id. at 263 (citing In re Establishment Inspection of Skil Corp., 846 F.2d 1127,
1133 (7th Cir. 1988)). Some forensic software even allows an agent to view the contents of a hard
drive without first determining whether a password is necessary to access the computer. See
United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 713–14 (10th Cir. 2007).
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Further, if police obtain a search warrant, they can also try to crack
the passcode or hack into the phone.103 And, of course, police may also
have to simply give up on the cell phone search if they fail to obtain
consent to search and are unable to access the phone after procuring a
search warrant.104 Nonetheless, while there remain ways for police to
search an arrestee’s cell phone incident to a lawful arrest, a passcode
provides the user with some level of protection in cell phone data by at
least requiring police to figure out a way to obtain or bypass the
passcode.
III. ENCRYPTED DATA VS. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT:
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. Encryption 101
Encryption is the process by which information is converted into an
unreadable form through the use of mathematical algorithms.105 The use
of these algorithms allows “an individual to ‘encrypt’ a message by
transforming its original form . . . into an unreadable form . . . . Anyone
who later obtains possession of the message will be unable to read it
without first ‘decrypting’ the message—by using a ‘key’ or by breaking
the code.”106 The text essentially becomes unreadable, appearing as ran-
dom letters, numbers, and symbols, unless the correct password is
entered to unscramble the text.107
Encryption has become so standard that computer and software
manufacturers consider it a basic security measure; even if the data is
lost or stolen, it could not be accessed without the owner’s password to
decrypt it.108 Moreover, encryption also provides “critical protection for
data stored on individuals’ personal computers. People keep vast
amounts of information on their digital devices, ranging from personal
correspondence to Internet browsing histories to sensitive medical
details.”109 As such, encryption is especially useful—and necessary—on
devices that can easily be lost or stolen, such as cell phones, tablets, and
laptops.110
103. See Gershowitz, supra note 95, at 1164.
104. See id. at 1154; see also Riley v. California, No. 13-132, slip op. at 12–13 (U.S. June 25,
2014) (explaining how when a phone locks with encryption security features the phone becomes
“all but ‘unbreakable’ unless police know the password”).
105. See Kenneth P. Weinberg, Cryptography: “Key Recovery” Shaping Cyberspace
(Pragmatism and Theory), 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 667, 673–74 (1998).
106. Id. at 674. For example, the algorithm “?3?” transforms the word “code” to “frgh” by
changing each letter to the letter three letters later in the alphabet. See id. at 673.
107. See id. at 673–74.
108. See Fruiterman, supra note 17, at 659.
109. Id. at 660.
110. See Kaufman, supra note 17, at 36; see also Guy McDowell, How to Encrypt Data on
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Most new computers have built-in encryption security as a basic
feature.111 Apple’s iOS platform on iPads, iPhones, and iPods also uses
encryption and data protection that protects the user’s data by either
preventing access or wiping the operating system clean if lost or sto-
len.112 However, most Android phones do not currently have built-in
data encryption.113 And neither iOS nor Android automatically encrypts
text messages where the user is required to enter a passcode to decrypt
the data before viewing the actual message. Regardless, using a pass-
code on the phone in general can protect text messages by requiring the
user to enter the correct passcode before he or she can read the message.
Third-party smartphone applications are also available, which will
encrypt text messages and emails.114 Further, text message encryption
applications are available for the iPhone, which require the recipient of a
text message to enter a passcode to view the message.115 Finally, text
messages between iPhone users on the iMessage platform are encrypted
Your Smartphone, MAKEUSEOF (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/how-to-encrypt-
data-on-your-smartphone/ (“To really secure your information, you need to use some sort of
encryption. By encrypting the data on your phone, even if someone gets past your lock screen,
whatever else is on the phone is pretty much useless to them.”). Statistics show that eighty-six
percent of Internet users have used strategies to avoid being observed online, including fourteen
percent who have encrypted their communications. See Lee Rainie, Sara Kiesler, Ruogu Kang &
Mary Madden, Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online, PEW RES. INTERNET PROJECT (Sept. 5,
2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/Anonymity-online/Summary-of-Findings/Key-
findings.aspx.
111. For example, one recent Apple Mac operating system, OS X Mavericks, includes
FileVault 2, which encrypts the entire Mac drive and all of its data, and also includes the ability to
encrypt any removable drive. See Apple—OS X Mavericks, APPLE, http://apple.com/osx/what-is/
security.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2014).
112. See iOS Security, APPLE, http://images.apple.com/iphone/business/docs/iOS_Security_
Feb14.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2014). Apple also provides additional protection with the ability to
wipe clean all the data on a phone after ten failed password attempts. See APPLE, IPHONE USER
GUIDE FOR IOS 7 (Oct. 2013), available at http://manuals.info.apple.com/MANUALS/1000/
MA1565/en_US/iphone_user_guide.pdf.
113. See Alex Wawro, How to Encrypt Your Smartphone, TECHHIVE (Oct. 28, 2011, 6:00 PM),
http://www.techhive.com/article/242650/how_to_encrypt_your_smartphone.html. Android is a
mobile operating system developed by Google. See Discover Android, ANDROID, http://www.
android.com/about/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2014).
114. See Wawro, supra note 113. For example, Android users have options such as AnDisk
Encryption to encrypt specific files or folders on their phones, as well as options like TextSecure
to encrypt text messages. Id. “TextSecure uses an advanced end to end encryption protocol that
provides privacy for every message every time.” TextSecure Private Messenger, GOOGLE PLAY,
http://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.thoughtcrime.securesms&hl=en (last visited Aug.
9, 2014).
115. See Casey Chan, Sending Secret Encrypted Text Messages on Your iPhone Just Got
Easier, GIZMODO (Jan. 29, 2013, 10:00 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5980083/sending-secret-
encrypted-text-messages-on-your-iphone-just-got-easier; Encrypt SMS, APPLE, http://itunes.apple
.com/us/app/encrypt-sms/id432891578?mt=8 (last visited Aug. 15, 2014); Encrypt SMS—Send
Secret Text Messages, APPLE, http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/encrypt-sms-send-secret-text/id
349861478 (last visited Aug. 15, 2014).
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via “end-to-end encryption” and are only stored by Apple “in encrypted
form for a limited period of time.”116 This “end-to-end encryption” has
made it impossible for law enforcement to intercept iMessages.117
Undoubtedly, with the growing use of encryption to protect per-
sonal data, the government’s attempts to compel production of pass-
words or encrypted data will also grow.118 Whether such compulsion
violates an individual’s Fifth Amendment privilege to be free from self-
incrimination poses interesting and unresolved questions.
B. The Circuit Split: Compelled Self-Incrimination or Not?
Several decisions to date demonstrate the disparate views regarding
the Fifth Amendment privilege to be free from self-incrimination and
compelled disclosure of passwords or production of encrypted data.119
Some courts have prohibited compelled disclosure of a password or pro-
duction of encrypted data due to the privilege against self-incrimination,
while others have determined that it does not violate the privilege.120
116. Zack Whittaker, U.S. Government Can’t Intercept iMessage, but It Can Still Serve Apple
a Search Warrant, ZDNET (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.zdnet.com/u-s-government-cant-intercept-
imessage-but-it-can-still-serve-apple-a-search-warrant-7000013533/ [hereinafter Whittaker
iMessage] (citing Apple Inc. Software License Agreement for OS X Mountain Lion, APPLE,
available at http://images.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/OSX108.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2014)).
117. See id. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, commonly referred to
as the “Electronic Communications Privacy Act” or the “Federal Wiretap Act,” regulates
wiretapping and electronic surveillance. 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 339 (2013).
Pursuant to this Act, federal law authorizes interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communications by court order when such interception may provide evidence of certain crimes.
18 U.S.C. § 2516. The judge may approve the order if there is probable cause to believe the
individual is committing or about to commit one of the offenses in section 2516. § 2518(3).
118. See Fruiterman, supra note 17, at 660.
119. See discussion infra Part III.B.
120. Compare In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d 1335, 1349 (11th Cir. 2012)
(the government could not show that the contents of a hard drive were a foregone conclusion, so
decryption and production would be testimonial and would implicate the Fifth Amendment), and
United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 669 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (compelled production of
a password violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege), with Order Granting Ex Parte
Request for Reconsideration of the United States’s Application Under the All Writs Act at 3, In re
Decryption of a Seized Data Storage System, No. 13-M-449 (E.D. Wis. May 21, 2013)
[hereinafter Order Granting Ex Parte Request for Reconsideration] (holding on reconsideration
that it was a foregone conclusion that the defendant had access to and control over the encrypted
files, so Fifth Amendment protection was no longer available), United States v. Fricosu, 841 F.
Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (D. Colo. 2012) (the Fifth Amendment was not implicated because the
government knew of the existence and location of the documents based on a recorded phone
conversation), and In re Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *10 (D. Vt.
Feb. 19, 2009) (the defendant had no act of production privilege because he admitted to
possession of the computer and had previously provided the government with access). The
Supreme Court has yet to address the issue.
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1. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITS COMPELLED
DISCLOSURE OR DECRYPTION
Most recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit considered self-incrimination in relation to encrypted documents,
applying Hubbell’s narrower view of the foregone conclusion doc-
trine.121 The Eleventh Circuit held that the appellant’s decryption and
production of hard drive contents would be testimonial in nature and
that, because the government could not show that the contents were a
“foregone conclusion,” the Fifth Amendment applied.122 The govern-
ment had subpoenaed the appellant to produce the decrypted contents of
his hard drives, but the appellant refused, invoking the Fifth Amend-
ment.123 On appeal, the court noted that the files themselves were not
testimonial in nature.124 However, under Fisher and Hubbell, production
was testimonial because the decryption password required the appellant
to use “the contents of the mind” to produce information that could be
incriminating.125
Similarly, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan refused to compel production of a computer password
because production would communicate a factual assertion to the gov-
ernment, which could reveal knowledge that might lead to incriminating
evidence.126 Thus, it appears that in cases in which the government can-
not show with “reasonable particularity” that it knew files existed on the
hard drives or that the accused could even access the encrypted hard
drives, compelled “testimony” in the form of a password would violate
the privilege to be free from self-incrimination.127
2. COMPELLED DISCLOSURE OR DECRYPTION DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Several decisions from lower courts have taken the alternative
121. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d at 1352.
122. See id. at 1349.
123. See id. at 1337–39.
124. Id. at 1342.
125. Id. at 1345–46 (citing United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000)).
126. See United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 669 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
127. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d at 1346. Also see United States v.
Pearson, where, although the government knew the defendant’s laptop contained incriminating
encrypted files, some of the encrypted files had allegedly been prepared by the defendant’s
father—who was also his attorney—and were attorney-client privileged material. No. 1:04-CR-
340, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32982, at *60–62 (N.D.N.Y. May 24, 2006). The United States
District Court for the Northern District of New York noted that production of the password would
authenticate the encrypted files that the defendant had prepared, but because the defendant’s father
had prepared some of the files, production of the password would not authenticate all the files. Id.
at 62. Thus, the government would have to show that it could authenticate the files by means other
than a compelled password. Id.
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view: compelled disclosure of passwords or production of encrypted
data does not violate the privilege to be free from self-incrimination.128
For example, the United States District Court for the District of Colo-
rado held that requiring production of encrypted contents of a laptop did
not implicate the Fifth Amendment because the government knew the
files existed and knew where they were located based on a recorded
phone conversation between the defendant and her husband.129 Relying
on the limited precedent dealing with compelled password production,
the court noted that while the contents of a document may not be privi-
leged, the act of producing the document might nonetheless be privi-
leged because the act of production acknowledges the document’s
existence.130
Similarly, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Wisconsin reversed a previous denial to compel a defendant to
decrypt electronic data upon the government’s discovery of new infor-
mation that rendered the contents of a hard drive a “foregone conclu-
sion.”131 The court had initially denied the government’s motion to
compel production because the government had not established that the
defendant “actually had access to and control over the encrypted storage
devices and, therefore, the files contained therein.”132 However, agents
were eventually able to access part of one of the hard drives, which
contained the incriminating evidence along with the defendant’s per-
sonal financial records and photographs of the defendant.133 Conse-
quently, under Fisher, the act of producing the decrypted data would not
use the contents of the defendant’s mind against him because the gov-
ernment was no longer relying on the defendant’s truth-telling to prove
128. Additionally, some legal scholars argue that courts should interpret the Fifth Amendment
so as to permit compelled production of passwords or decrypted content to balance the state’s
interest and the individual’s interest. See generally Dan Terzian, The Fifth Amendment,
Encryption, and the Forgotten State Interest, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 298 (2014)
(emphasizing the importance of the state’s interest).
129. See United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1235, 1237 (D. Colo. 2012). The
defendant and her husband discussed something being on the laptop and discussed refusing to
provide the password. Id. at 1235. Although the government did not know the specific contents of
the documents located on the encrypted laptop, that lack of knowledge did not prohibit
production. See id. at 1237 (citation omitted).
130. See id. at 1236 (citing United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984); Hubbell, 530 U.S.
at 36).
131. See Order Granting Ex Parte Request for Reconsideration, supra note 120, at 3.
132. Id. at 2 (quoting Order Denying Application to Compel Decryption at 8, In re Decryption
of a Seized Data Storage System, No. 13-M-449 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 2013)). The storage devices
in question were found in the defendant’s home where he lived alone, but the computer only had
the username “Jeff” on the login screen, and the defendant had not admitted to access and control
over the encrypted devices. Id. (citing Order Denying Application to Compel Decryption, supra
note 132, at 8–9).
133. Id. at 2–3.
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that the data existed or that he had access to the data.134
Likewise, in In re Boucher, the United States District Court for the
District of Vermont also relied on the foregone conclusion doctrine in
determining that compelled production of a decrypted version of a
laptop hard drive did not violate the privilege.135 In In re Boucher, the
defendant initially provided access to the incriminating files, but later
refused to provide the password.136 However, because the defendant
already provided access to the drive once, providing access again would
add “little or nothing to the sum total of the Government’s information
. . . .”137 Further, the defendant did not have an act of production privi-
lege because he already admitted to possession of the computer, so his
act of producing a decrypted version was not necessary to authenticate
the data.138
These cases seem to denote that the foregone conclusion doctrine,
in many cases, will avoid a Fifth Amendment violation. However, the
lack of clarity regarding the proper standard to apply to the foregone
conclusion doctrine remains a problem.139 Without the Supreme Court
addressing the confusion, it remains to be seen as to whether compelled
disclosure of passwords or production of encrypted data is a testimonial
act that would implicate the privilege to be free from self-incrimination.
IV. THE “BIOMETRIC REVOLUTION”
Biometrics are “measurable biological (anatomical and physiologi-
cal) and behavioral characteristic[s] that can be used for automated rec-
ognition.”140 Biometric authentication is the method of identifying a
person by his or her unique physical characteristics.141 At the most basic
level, “an individual’s physical traits are scanned by a machine and then
a comparison is made to a database containing previously stored infor-
mation about that individual.”142 Biometric authentication can be used to
either verify that the person is who he or she claims to be, or to identify
134. See id. at 1–3 (“[T]he government has now persuaded me that it is a ‘foregone
conclusion’ that [the defendant] has access to and control over the subject encrypted storage
devices.”).
135. No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006, at *10 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009).
136. See id. at *4–5.
137. Id. at *9 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976)).
138. See id. at *9–10.
139. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
140. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL SUBCOMM. ON BIOMETRICS & IDENTITY MGMT.,
BIOMETRICS GLOSSARY 4 (2006), available at http://biometrics.gov/Documents/Glossary.pdf
[hereinafter NSTCS BIOMETRICS GLOSSARY].
141. See Ng, supra note 14, at 428.
142. Id.
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an unknown person.143 For example, when someone shows up at a
security checkpoint claiming to be “John Doe,” that person’s biometrics
are checked against the system which contains the biometrics of “John
Doe,” and the system verifies that the person is in fact that particular
“John Doe.”144 Alternatively, an unknown person’s biometrics can be
checked against a database to determine who that person is, such as
matching a fingerprint found at a crime scene to the FBI’s database.145
The use of biometrics by the government and governmental agen-
cies is nothing new.146 In 2008, President George W. Bush signed the
“Directive on Biometrics for Identification and Screening To Enhance
National Security,”
establish[ing] a framework to ensure that Federal executive depart-
ments and agencies . . . use mutually compatible methods and proce-
dures in the collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of
biometric and associated biographic and contextual information of
individuals in a lawful and appropriate manner, while respecting their
information privacy and other legal rights under United States law.147
The use of biometrics has also been prevalent in commerce and
commercial security due to the recent proliferation of “electronic identi-
ties” and the need to ensure proper identification.148 Innovative compa-
nies have tapped into this niche market by developing biometric
143. See NSTCS BIOMETRICS GLOSSARY, supra note 140 (defining “identification”). Using
biometrics to verify that someone is whom he or she claims to be is known as “closed-set
identification,” or “one-to-one matching.” See id. (defining “closed-set identification”); Robin
Feldman, Considerations on the Emerging Implementation of Biometric Technology, 25 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 653, 655–56 (2003) (explaining “one-to-one matching”).
144. See Feldman, supra note 143, at 655–56.
145. See id. at 656. Comparing an unknown person’s biometrics against a database is referred
to as “open-set identification,” or “one-to-many matching.” See NSTCS BIOMETRICS GLOSSARY,
supra note 140 (defining “open-set identification”); Feldman, supra note 143, at 656 (explaining
“one-to-many matching”).
146. See, e.g., Standards for Biometric Technologies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t
Operations of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) (testimony of
Charles H. Romine, Director, Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards
and Technology, United States Department of Commerce) [hereinafter Standards], available at
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO24/20130619/101010/HHRG-113-GO24-Wstate-Romine
C-20130619.pdf (“For decades, biometric technologies were used primarily in law enforcement
applications, and they are still a key component of these important applications.”).
147. Directive on Biometrics for Identification and Screening To Enhance National Security, 1
PUB. PAPERS 757 (June 5, 2008), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2008-book1/
pdf/PPP-2008-book1-doc-pg757.pdf. The directive acknowledged that many agencies were
already collecting biometric information in their identification and screening processes, and that
the harmonization of their collecting, storing, and sharing procedures would help identify
“individuals who may do harm to Americans and the Nation . . . .” Id.
148. See Government Biometrics Activity, BIOMETRIC CONSORTIUM, http://biometrics.org/
government.php (last visited Aug. 9, 2014); see also Standards, supra note 146, at 2 (“Over the
past several years, the marketplace for biometrics solutions has widened significantly and today
includes public and private sector applications worldwide.”).
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authentication products solely for commerce.149
A. An Array of Biometric Authentication Methods
Various biometric authentication methods currently exist. Some of
the more prevalent ones include fingerprint analysis, facial recognition,
iris scanning, voice recognition, and DNA analysis. However, finger-
print identification has been the most commonly used and accepted form
of biometric authentication.150
Fingerprint identification has been used in the criminal context by
law enforcement since the early twentieth century.151 Due to the high
degree of confidence in fingerprint identification and the ease in which
fingerprint sensors can be embedded in devices, “fingerprint-based
authentication is becoming more and more popular in a number of civil-
ian and commercial applications such as, welfare disbursement, cellular
phone access and laptop computer log-in.”152 All fingertips have unique
ridge formation patterns.153 Fingerprint identification involves compar-
ing these unique ridge formations with stored formations.154 Fingerprint
authentication provides benefits over other forms of biometric authenti-
cation because fingerprints do not change throughout the course of an
individual’s lifetime,155 no two people have the same ridge formation,
and it is a quick and noninvasive means of identification.156 However,
because dirt, oils, or cuts on the finger can result in identification
errors,157 and because fingerprints can easily be lifted from surfaces with
tape, fingerprint authentication also has disadvantages.158
149. See, e.g., Biometrics in E-commerce, BIOENABLE, http://www.biometricsintegrated.com/
biometrics-in-e-commerce (last visited Aug. 9, 2014) (offering e-commerce biometric products
and software).
150. See Ng, supra note 14, at 429.
151. See id. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s fingerprint database contains fingerprints
and corresponding criminal history of more than 47 million people. See id.
152. A. Jameer Basha et al., Efficient Multimodal Biometric Authentication Using Fast
Fingerprint Verification and Enhanced Iris Features, 7 J. COMPUTER SCI. 698, 698 (2011).
153. See Ng, supra note 14, at 429.
154. See id.
155. However, Apple warns that “[c]ertain activities can . . . temporarily affect fingerprint
recognition, including exercising, showering, swimming, cooking, or other conditions or changes
that affect your fingerprint.” Using Touch ID, supra note 1.
156. See Ng, supra note 14, at 429–30.
157. See Using Touch ID, supra note 1.
158. See Jose Pagliery, iPhone Fingerprint Scanner Will Start Security Revolution,
CNNMONEY (Sept. 11, 2013, 3:04 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/11/technology/security/
iphone-fingerprint-scanner/index.html. Indeed, fingerprint misidentifications do occur. See, e.g.,
Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 966 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing the false positive
fingerprint identification of Brandon Mayfield following the 2004 terrorist bombing on commuter
trains in Madrid, Spain); Simon A. Cole, More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent
Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985 (2005) (reviewing known
fingerprint misidentification cases and explaining the potential identification error rate).
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Facial recognition technology is an increasingly discussed method
of biometric authentication.159 “Facial recognition . . . involves taking a
picture of a subject’s face or capturing [his or her] image from video
surveillance. The system then processes the image and converts it into a
digital template based on the geometry of the individual’s face.”160 One
of facial recognition technology’s benefits is its unobtrusive nature due
to the ability to capture images without the suspect’s knowledge or
cooperation.161 Additionally, changes in hairstyle, color, and facial
expressions do not impede the technology’s ability to identify sub-
jects.162 However, facial recognition technology is not as accurate as
other methods of biometric authentication due to poor lighting, shadows,
and glare.163
Iris scanning is another emerging means of biometric authentica-
tion. Iris scanning involves scanning the colored part of the eye sur-
rounding the pupil and comparing it to stored images in a database.164
The iris structure is unique to each individual based on “the [cornea],
pits, filaments, crypts, striation, radial furrows, and other structures.”165
Iris scanning is non-invasive, can be done from up to three feet away,
and results are available in seconds.166 However, iris scanning has its
disadvantages because the subject needs to cooperate to obtain a usable
iris image and sunglasses prevent the scans.167
Voice recognition is another form of biometric authentication,
which identifies an individual based on his or her voice.168 The voice
recognition system “analyzes the frequency content of the speech and
compares characteristics such as the quality, duration, intensity, dynam-
ics, and pitch of the signal.”169 The system then compares the voice of
159. See, e.g., Yana Welinder, Facing Real-Time Identification in Mobile Apps & Wearable
Computers, 30 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 89 (2004) (discussing real-time
facial recognition applications in mobile devices). Facial recognition first generated public
discussion after the 2001 Super Bowl when it was used as a trial to compare surveillance images
of attendees to a mug shot database. See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL SUBCOMM. ON BIOMETRICS
& IDENTITY MGMT., FACE RECOGNITION 1 (2006), available at http://biometrics.gov/Documents/
FaceRec.pdf  [hereinafter NSTCS FACE RECOGNITION].
160. Ng, supra note 14, at 432.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 433.
164. See id. at 431. An infrared scan reveals the patterns in the iris structure. See Feldman,
supra note 143, at 661.
165. Ng, supra note 14, at 431 n.55 (citation omitted).
166. See id. at 431.
167. See id. at 432.
168. See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL SUBCOMM. ON BIOMETRICS & IDENTITY MGMT.,
SPEAKER RECOGNITION 1 (2006), available at http://biometrics.gov/Documents/SpeakerRec.pdf
[hereinafter NSTCS SPEAKER RECOGNITION].
169. Id.
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the subject saying a fixed password to the voice that is programmed into
the system for that password.170 While voice recognition is a relatively
simple authentication method, it also poses significant concerns because
background noise can affect the authentication and because voices can
change.171
Another widely accepted means of biometric authentication is DNA
analysis.172 DNA has been called “the instruction manual for every liv-
ing organism.”173 DNA is found in blood, semen, saliva, vaginal secre-
tions, skin, hair roots, urine, feces, bones, teeth, nasal secretion, vomitus,
and cells from any tissues or organs.174 The FBI has the ability to com-
pare suspects’ DNA through its Combined DNA Index System
(“CODIS”).175 Unlike the noninvasive nature of fingerprint analysis, a
disadvantage of DNA analysis is that it generally involves invasive tech-
niques, such as taking a blood sample or mouth swab.176 Nonetheless,
because a tiny amount of DNA found at a crime scene can be amplified
and reliably compared to the FBI’s database, DNA analysis is the pre-
ferred method of identification for law enforcement.177
B. Biometric Authentication’s Growing Prevalence in
Consumer Devices
In 2011, approximately seventy-five percent of households reported
having a computer.178 Moreover, in 2013, ninety-one percent of Ameri-
can adults reported owning a cell phone, and the percentage of American
adults who own a smartphone instead of a basic cell phone continues to
grow.179 In late 2013, Apple unveiled its then-latest version of the
170. See id.
171. See John D. Woodward, Biometric Scanning, Law & Policy: Identifying the Concerns—
Drafting the Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 97, 107 (1997).
172. See Ng, supra note 14, at 431.
173. CECILIA HAGEMAN ET AL., DNA HANDBOOK 3 (2002).
174. See id. at 22–23. A person’s DNA profile resembles a bar code; each line represents the
size of the specific piece of DNA, known as short tandem repeats (“STR”). See id. at 1. “Due to
the significant variability in the sizes of STR DNA possible . . . an individual’s genetic profile is
extremely unlikely to be found elsewhere in the world, except in the case of identical siblings.” Id.
175. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2013).
176. See Ng, supra note 14, at 431.
177. See id. at 430–31. The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that “the utility of DNA
identification in the criminal justice system is already undisputed. . . . [L]aw enforcement, the
defense bar, and the courts have acknowledged DNA testing’s ‘unparalleled ability both to
exonerate the wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty.’” King, 133 S. Ct. at 1966 (citation
omitted).
178. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED STATES 1
(2013), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-569.pdf.
179. See Aaron Smith, Smartphone Ownership 2013, PEW RES. INTERNET PROJECT (June 5,
2013), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2013/Smartphone-Ownership-2013/Findings.aspx. For
example, in May 2013, fifty-six percent of U.S. adults indicated that they owned a smartphone, up
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smartphone, the iPhone 5s, which included a fingerprint reader called
Touch ID.180 In response to Apple’s release, HTC debuted its version of
a fingerprint sensor in the HTC One Max, a competing Android
smartphone.181 Critics suggest, “Apple’s combination of ease-of-use and
more robust security is why Touch ID will help popularize fingerprint
and other biometric scanners on consumer gadgets . . . .”182 Addition-
ally, “security experts largely see Touch ID as a positive step that could
take society a step closer to eliminating much more hack-prone PINs
and passwords . . . .”183
One overwhelming benefit of biometric authentication on personal
devices is always having the means of identification with you.184 With
biometric authentication, the days of straining to remember complex
passwords could cease to exist. Fingerprint readers are also available on
laptops.185 Fingerprint authentication specifically “has increasingly seen
an uptick in consumer devices, notably laptops. With a swipe of a finger,
a device can unlock or decrypt documents without the need for remem-
bering passwords.”186 Some smartphones even offer “Face Unlock,”
which uses the phone’s camera and facial recognition technology to
from forty-six percent in February 2012 and thirty-five percent in May 2011, according to the Pew
Research Center. Id. A smartphone is “a cellular phone ‘that has the ability to store data,
photographs, and videos.’” People v. Rangel, 206 Cal. App. 4th 1310, 1313 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
A smartphone is “akin to a personal computer because it has the capacity to store people’s names,
telephone numbers and other contact information, as well as music, photographs, artwork, and
communications in the form of e-mails and messages . . . .” Id. at 1316.
180. See Using Touch ID, supra note 1 and accompanying text. “To set up Touch ID, you must
first set a passcode. Touch ID is designed to minimize the input of your passcode, but you need a
passcode for additional security validation, such as enrolling new fingerprints.” Using Touch ID,
supra note 1. “If Touch ID doesn’t recognize your finger, you’ll be asked to try again. After three
attempts, you’ll be given the option of entering your passcode. After two more tries, you will need
to enter your passcode.” Id. Additionally, the user must enter the passcode in three instances: (1)
after restarting the iPhone; (2) when more than forty-eight hours elapsed since the iPhone was last
unlocked; and (3) to enter the Touch ID and Passcode setting screen. See id.
181. See David Quinn, HTC One 2 (M8) to Use Sapphire for Its Fingerprint Scanner?,
ANDROIDORIGIN (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.androidorigin.com/htc-one-2-sapphire-fingerprint-
scanner/.
182. Pagliery, supra note 158.
183. Id.
184. E.g., iPhone 5s: About Touch Security, APPLE, http://support.apple.com/kb/HT5949 (last
modified Mar. 8, 2014) (“Your fingerprint is one of the best passcodes in the world. It’s always
with you, and no two are exactly alike.”).
185. See, e.g., Using HP SimplePass Fingerprint Reader (Windows 8), HEWLETT-PACKARD,
http://h10025.www1.hp.com/ewfrf/wc/document?cc=us&lc=en&dlc=en&docname=c03653209
(last visited Aug. 9, 2014) (explaining fingerprint readers included on some HP notebook
computers).
186. Zack Whittaker, iPhone 5S Fingerprint Reader: Doubling Down on Identity, a Death
Knell to Passwords?, ZDNET (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.zdnet.com/iphone-5s-fingerprint-
reader-doubling-down-on-identity-a-death-knell-to-passwords-7000020547/ [hereinafter
Whittaker iPhone].
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unlock the phone with a scan of the user’s face.187 Undoubtedly, the
smartphone mass market will continue to drive the growth of biometric
authentication in other consumer devices.188 Moreover, because biomet-
ric authentication provides a more secure method of identification, an
increased prevalence of biometric authentication in personal devices has
the ability to boost mobile commerce.189 As companies’ revenues
increase due to a boost in mobile commerce from biometric authentica-
tion, funding for biometric development will likely increase.190 As
research and development increases, the prevalence in consumer devices
will also likely increase, continuing to fuel the “Biometric
Revolution.”191
V. THE “BIOMETRIC REVOLUTION” MEETS THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
With the growing prevalence of biometric authentication in our
everyday lives,192 it is important to consider how it may impact our
basic constitutional rights. Although biometric authentication is nothing
new for the government or organizations using the latest in security
measures,193 biometric authentication is a relatively new concept for the
general public with its arrival in the form of portable consumer devices.
The iPhone 5s has introduced biometric authentication everywhere peo-
ple go—homes, schools, malls, workplaces, restaurants, gyms, and
libraries. Given the prevalence of the iPhone and Apple’s industry-lead-
ing position, some have noted that we can expect the use of biometric
187. See Introducing Android 4.0, ANDROID, http://www.android.com/about/ice-cream-
sandwich/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2014) (noting that the user still has the option to use a backup PIN
or pattern to unlock the phone).
188. See King, supra note 9.
189. See id.
190. See, e.g., Ben McClure, R&D Spending and Profitability: What’s the Link?,
INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/fundamental-analysis/10/
research-development-rorc.asp (“At the end of the day, the productivity of R&D [(“Research and
Development”)] is what drives technology company profits, and ultimately their share prices.”);
Raul O. Chao et al., Revenue Driven Resource Allocation: Funding Authority, Incentives, and
New Product Development Portfolio Management, 55 MGMT. SCI. 1451, 1558 (2009) (discussing
how improving products and developing new products sustains or enhances revenue).
191. For example, in its 2013 Annual Report, Apple Inc. stated,
[t]he Company continues to believe that focused investments in R&D are critical to
its future growth and competitive position in the marketplace and are directly related
to timely development of new and enhanced products that are central to the
Company’s core business strategy. As such, the Company expects to make further
investments in R&D to remain competitive.
APPLE INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) 33 (Oct. 30, 2013), available at http://investor.apple.
com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1193125-13-416534&CIK=320193.
192. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
193. See id.
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authentication in other personal media devices to increase.194
A. Biometric Authentication Is Not a Foregone Conclusion
At the outset, some may question the need to even consider the
implications of biometric authentication on the Fifth Amendment due to
the foregone conclusion doctrine. It could be argued that the foregone
conclusion doctrine removes Fifth Amendment protection from text
messages and emails because the government knows that text messages
and emails exist on a phone.195 Arguably, under Fisher, production of
the data theoretically might not constitute incriminating testimony
because most people are aware that data is located on a smartphone, so a
person admitting to having that data would not add anything to the gov-
ernment’s case.196
In Fisher, however, even though the documents might have con-
tained incriminating writing, the government was not compelling the
accused himself to produce incriminating testimony because producing
the accountant’s documents in compliance with the subpoena “would
express nothing more than the taxpayer’s belief that the papers are those
described in the subpoena.”197 Alternatively, in the case of biometric
authentication, the question would be whether or not the government
compelled the accused himself to produce incriminating testimony via
the authentication.
Additionally, Hubbell later made clear that the foregone conclusion
doctrine did not apply to overbroad foregone conclusions like “business
documents.”198 One could argue that “text messages and emails” pos-
sessed by all smartphone users are akin to “business documents” pos-
sessed by a businessman.199 If this argument were successful, text
messages and emails would not be considered a “foregone conclusion,”
unless the government could show that it had specific knowledge of the
contents of certain text messages, emails, or documents located on the
194. See Hoffman, supra note 17 (“Given Apple’s industry-leading position, it’s probably not
a far stretch to expect this kind of authentication to take off.”); see also King, supra note 9
(Biometrics Research Group, Inc., “predicts that Apple will initially lead in the deployment of
such devices, due to the fact that the firm is the first consumer electronics provider to introduce
biometric technology to the global smartphone mass market.”).
195. See discussion supra Part II.B (discussing the foregone conclusion doctrine).
196. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411, 414 (1976).
197. Id. at 412–13.
198. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 45 (2000) (“The Government cannot cure [its
lack of prior knowledge of the existence or whereabouts of the documents] through the overbroad
argument that a businessman such as respondent will always possess general business and tax
records that fall within the broad categories described in this subpoena.”).
199. See Riley v. California, No. 13-132, slip op. at 18 (U.S. June 25, 2014) (“Even the most
basic phones . . . might hold photographs, picture messages, text messages, Internet browsing
history, a calendar, a thousand-entry phone book, and so on.”).
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device in question.200 Professor Gershowitz suggests that, based on Hub-
bell’s specificity requirement, the foregone conclusion argument “should
fail in the vast majority of cases, because without knowing the specific
contents of the phone, police are not in a position to say before the
search what evidence will be found once the arrestee enters his
password.”201
However, because there continues to be relatively little guidance as
to how specific the government’s independent knowledge must be for
the evidence to be a “foregone conclusion,” we cannot confidently say
that the contents of a phone are protected from the foregone conclusion
doctrine’s limiting effect on the privilege against self-incrimination.202
Moreover, the government’s ability to lawfully intercept electronic com-
munications further complicates this issue.203 iPhone users sending
secure text messages via the iMessage platform may be protected from
the government’s ability to gain independent knowledge of incriminat-
ing evidence based on iMessage’s “end-to-end encryption.”204 However,
an iPhone user sending a text message to a non-iPhone user, as well as
text messages between non-iPhone users, would likely be more suscepti-
ble to the government’s ability to intercept those messages and gain
independent knowledge of the incriminating evidence.205
Consequently, the foregone conclusion doctrine does not dismiss
the need to consider the implications of biometric authentication on the
privilege against self-incrimination. If the data located on a personal
200. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44–45. Thus, while one could argue that possession and
ownership of the phone and the phone numbers linked to potentially incriminating phone calls,
text messages, emails, and photos, could be independently verified by phone bills, the actual
information contained within the phone would probably not be a foregone conclusion without
specific knowledge of their contents.
201. Gershowitz, supra note 95, at 1173. “In light of the specificity required by Hubbell,
prosecutors will likely be unsuccessful in making vague assertions that the contents of text
messages on a cell phone are a foregone conclusion.” Id.
202. See Kaufman, supra note 17, at 37 (“The standard by which a foregone conclusion is
analyzed is not settled, and the Supreme Court has provided little guidance.”); see also discussion
supra Part II.B.
203. See supra note 117 (discussing the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act).
204. See Whittaker iMessage, supra note 116 (discussing how the iMessage platform makes it
impossible for the government to intercept messages between users).
205. See Andy Greenberg, Ten Million More Android Users’ Text Messages Will Soon Be
Encrypted by Default, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2013, 4:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andy
greenberg/2013/12/09/ten-million-more-android-users-text-messages-will-soon-be-encrypted-by-
default/ (explaining how Android users that have replaced the Android operating system with the
CyanogenMod operating system will have TextSecure as the phone’s default text messaging
platform, and discussing how TextSecure’s end-to-end encryption prevents text messages from
being intercepted); see also supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text; cf. Dan Goodin, Think
Your Skype Messages Get End-to-End Encryption? Think Again, ARS TECHNICA (May 20, 2013,
12:17 PM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/05/think-your-skype-messages-get-end-to-end-
encryption-think-again/ (discussing how Skype messages can be intercepted).
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device was not a “foregone conclusion,” and law enforcement needed
the accused to authenticate the device, one could argue that the authenti-
cation would provide the government with a “‘lead to incriminating evi-
dence,’ or ‘a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute.’”206 The
analysis would then turn to whether the act of production—biometric
authentication—would be considered “testimonial in nature,” such that
it required the accused to use the contents of his mind, or if it was
merely an analysis of physical traits.207
B. Biometric Authentication: An Analysis of Physical Traits
1. COMPELLED BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION IS NOT
SELF-INCRIMINATING
Although the science behind biometric authentication itself may be
extremely technical and complex, an initial consideration of its impact
on the Fifth Amendment suggests a much simpler legal analysis. While
the privilege against self-incrimination bars compelling communications
or testimony, compulsion that makes the suspect the source of physical
evidence does not.208 Given that biometric authentication is merely a
scan of physical traits that are compared to previously stored informa-
tion,209 one can argue that compelled biometric authentication is not
barred by the self-incrimination privilege. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that compelling an accused to demonstrate physical
characteristics for identification purposes does not qualify as compelled
self-incrimination because it is not testimonial in nature.210 Likewise, if
an accused was compelled to place his finger on his laptop’s fingerprint
reader, or have his face scanned with his phone’s facial recognition
software, the physical characteristics would have been used for identifi-
cation purposes and would likely not be considered “testimonial in
nature” such that the scan would violate the self-incrimination
privilege.211
206. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 42 (2000).
207. Cf. id. at 41–42 (the accused’s act of production required him to use the contents of his
mind in locating 13,120 pages of materials, akin to answering interrogatories).
208. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
209. See Ng, supra note 14, at 428; see also discussion supra Part IV.A.
210. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266–67 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 222 (1967); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761; Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 (1910);
see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 176 F. App’x 72, 74 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S.
818 (2006) (“the Supreme Court has held that a handwriting exemplar is an identifying physical
characteristic that falls outside the protection of the Fifth Amendment”).
211. See Kaufman, supra note 17, at 40 (suggesting that compelling a person to place a finger
on a fingerprint reader is not a “testimonial act within the meaning of the privilege”); Hoffman,
supra note 17 (noting that because biometrics are not something people remember, it is less likely
that the self-incrimination privilege would apply). But see Susan W. Brenner, Intellectual
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Moreover, biometric authentication does not reveal the contents of
the accused’s mind. Unlike instances where defendants are compelled to
reveal their passwords that they committed to memory, biometric
authentication does not reveal anything committed to memory.212 Com-
pelling the accused to stand still for an iris scan or to place his finger-
print on a fingerprint reader does not convey where he was last night,
whether he committed a crime, or if he has any information regarding an
investigation. In short, it reveals nothing other than whether he is or is
not the person whose physical traits are associated with the device in
question.213 While it may be argued that biometric authentication is
analogous to an accused saying, “this smartphone is mine,” and thus
impliedly asserting that any incriminating text messages, emails, or
photos discovered within the device were his, this argument would
likely fail.214 Because biometric authentication is an analysis of physical
traits, the Supreme Court would likely treat it just like other compelled
exhibitions of physical characteristics used for identification purposes.
Thus, just like fingerprint analyses, handwriting exemplars, voice exem-
plars, and blood analyses, which do not violate the privilege against self-
incrimination,215 using fingerprint recognition, iris scanning, facial rec-
ognition, voice recognition, and DNA analysis as a means of identifica-
tion also would not implicate the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination. Surely, just like discovering incriminating evidence after
Property Law Symposium: Encryption, Smart Phones, and the Fifth Amendment, 33 WHITTIER L.
REV. 525, 538 (2012) (suggesting that the Supreme Court could rule either way). Additionally,
while compelling an accused to place his finger on his phone’s fingerprint reader or have his face
scanned with his phone’s facial recognition software might only be used for identification
purposes, it could constitute an impermissible seizure under the Fourth Amendment if police were
only detaining the suspect, did not have an arrest warrant, and lacked probable cause to arrest. See
Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 814–15 (1985) (fingerprinting the detained suspect at the police
station without an arrest warrant or probable cause to arrest was an impermissible seizure under
the Fourth Amendment); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727–28 (1969) (petitioner’s Fourth
Amendment rights were violated when he was detained, fingerprinted, and interrogated without an
arrest warrant or probable cause to arrest).
212. See Kaufman, supra note 17, at 41 (“It would be a stretch for defendants or witnesses to
argue that such acts compel one to produce the contents of the mind.”).
213. See supra notes 140–45 and accompanying text.
214. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia considered this analogy
in United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 573–74 (D.C. Cir. 1999), aff’d, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
The majority explained that when a suspect is compelled to submit to fingerprint analysis, while
the suspect “can be said to be communicating that this is my hand and it contains five fingerprints
unique to my person . . . the individual has merely been compelled to make himself available as a
source of real or physical evidence.” Id. at 574 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
215. See Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 266–67 (handwriting exemplar does not violate the privilege);
Wade, 388 U.S. at 222–23 (voice exemplar does not violate the privilege); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at
761 (taking a blood sample was not compelled testimony in violation of the privilege, nor would
compulsion to submit to fingerprinting be a violation).
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an arrestee provides a password or permission to search a device, police
may discover incriminating evidence after an arrestee unlocks a device
via biometric authentication.216
Consider the hypothetical posed at the outset of this article.
Whether the government compels the accused to unlock his phone via
subpoena, the suspect voluntarily provides the passcode after police
obtain a warrant, or the suspect consents to the search during interroga-
tion and provides the passcode, the government could obtain text
messages and emails relating to illegal activity that the user sent. Thus,
like Hubbell, where producing the subpoenaed documents was not itself
incriminating but might lead to incriminating evidence,217 the act of bio-
metric authentication itself might not be incriminating, but it may pro-
vide the link necessary to obtain the incriminating evidence inside the
phone.218 Nevertheless, under Hubbell, if the government could show
that the information contained within the phone was a “foregone conclu-
sion,” the fact that biometric authentication provided that link to the evi-
dence would be irrelevant.219
Interestingly, yet problematically, biometric authentication might
even resolve the difficulties law enforcement has traditionally encoun-
tered in accessing locked devices or encrypted data. While Professor
Gershowitz suggests that “cell-phone users could password protect their
phones and shift the legal issues into more complicated Fourth and Fifth
Amendment territory,”220 biometric authentication may render users
with even fewer options in protecting their phones and other personal
devices.221 Ironically, the convenience and protection generally associ-
ated with biometric authentication may actually make a user’s life more
problematic by having less legal protection.
Recall the discussion of cell phone searches incident to arrest in
Part II.C. Regardless of whether police obtained consent to search the
216. Compare People v. Rangel, 206 Cal. App. 4th 1310, 1313–14 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (where
the suspect only gave the detective permission to search the phone to look up the suspect’s
girlfriend’s number, but the detective also read the suspect’s text messages and found
incriminating evidence that was later used against the suspect), with United States v. Hubbell, 530
U.S. 27, 41–42 (2000) (where producing a breadth of subpoenaed documents was akin to
answering interrogatories, which could lead to incriminating evidence that would later be used
against the respondent).
217. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 42.
218. See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (explaining that the
privilege against self-incrimination does not only apply to answers that would themselves alone
support a conviction, but also applies to answers that provide the government with a link in the
chain of evidence necessary to prosecute the accused).
219. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43–45 (discussing how the foregone conclusion doctrine negates
self-incrimination claims).
220. Gershowitz, supra note 95, at 1144.
221. See discussion infra Part V.B.1.
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phone or obtained a warrant permitting the search, police would no
longer need to then also procure the passcode by consent, nor would
interrogation occur, under which Miranda would provide some form of
protection.222 Considering biometric authentication is merely a measure
of physical characteristics, law enforcement would no longer need the
accused to reveal the contents of his mind—in the form of the pass-
code—via consent.223 As to voice recognition, if the suspect first
declines to cooperate for authentication by refusing to speak for the rec-
ognition software, and police initiated questioning in an attempt to elicit
a response that would hopefully authenticate the device, such question-
ing would arguably constitute interrogation and the suspect would be
afforded Miranda’s protections.224 However, in such a case, even if a
Miranda violation occurred, any physical evidence obtained as a result
likely would still be admissible at trial because the Supreme Court has
declined to extend the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to the Miranda
rule.225 Additionally, because biometric authentication can be done
almost instantaneously without saying anything,226 it is difficult to imag-
ine how most methods of biometric authentication would even constitute
“interrogation” to require Miranda’s safeguards.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical in which police obtain a
search warrant for the home of a person who is suspected of having been
involved in an armed robbery, and the warrant also permits the officers
to search the suspect’s cell phone. After searching the suspect’s home,
the police determine that they have probable cause to arrest the suspect.
Immediately after police handcuff the suspect and prior to giving the
suspect his or her Miranda rights, police locate the suspect’s smartphone
on his or her person. The smartphone has facial recognition enabled and,
without asking the suspect any questions, police scan the suspect’s face
with the phone, and the phone automatically unlocks. Pursuant to the
search warrant, police look through the suspect’s text messages and find
a text message conversation between the suspect and an individual
already in custody, who confessed to being involved, making plans to
222. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
223. See Kaufman, supra note 17, at 41 (suggesting that the government would argue that
compelling a defendant to put his finger on a fingerprint reader is not “a testimonial act within the
meaning of the privilege,” and noting that, “[i]t would be a stretch for defendants . . . to argue that
such acts compel one to produce the contents of the mind”). Nevertheless, although police might
not need the suspect to consent and voluntarily provide the passcode, they would still need the
suspect to physically cooperate to authenticate the device.
224. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that the privilege against self-
incrimination requires procedural safeguards prior to custodial interrogation).
225. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
226. See Ng, supra note 14, at 431 (iris scanning is done in seconds); Using Touch ID, supra
note 1 (Touch ID quickly reads fingerprints and automatically unlocks the phone).
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meet one hour prior to the robbery on the night the robbery occurred.
Upon seeing the police reading the text messages, the suspect also
makes an incriminating statement, still having yet to receive his or her
Miranda warnings. At trial, the defendant alleges a violation of the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination. However, the court would probably
determine that custodial interrogation had not occurred because the
police never initiated questioning prior to the incriminating statement.227
Thus, not only would the incriminating text messages be admissible, the
incriminating statement would be admissible as well.
Additionally, police would no longer have to procure a subpoena to
compel the suspect to provide the passcode because biometric authenti-
cation would allow simple, immediate access through a mere physical
trait analysis. Police and prosecutors would no longer need to “compel
production” of passcodes or encrypted data therein to obtain the evi-
dence they need to prosecute, and the ability to “invoke the Fifth” would
disappear.
Similarly, police would never have to try to crack the passcode with
biometric authentication.228 Biometric authentication would essentially
ensure that police could get into the smartphone upon a quick authenti-
cation via the suspect’s physical trait. And, quite obviously, police
would never have to give up on the cell phone search anymore because
biometric authentication would provide access if the police wanted
access.
Moreover, the government’s ability to grant immunity for the act of
producing a memorized passcode weakens a claim that biometric
authentication implicates the Fifth Amendment. Under the act of produc-
tion doctrine, self-incrimination may result merely from the act of pro-
ducing evidence in response to a subpoena when the evidence has “a
compelled testimonial aspect.”229 However, provided the government
can show that the evidence used to obtain the indictment and offered at
trial “was derived from legitimate sources ‘wholly independent’ of the
testimonial aspect of [the accused’s] immunized conduct,” the accused
can be compelled to produce a passcode after receiving a grant of immu-
227. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (defining custodial interrogation as “questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way”).
228. See Gershowitz, supra note 95, at 1164 (noting that cracking the passcode is one way for
police to gain access to the data in an arrestee’s cell phone).
229. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36 (2000). The act of production doctrine
“provides that persons compelled to turn over incriminating papers or other physical evidence
pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum or a summons may invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination as a bar to production only where the act of producing the evidence
would contain ‘testimonial’ features.” Id. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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nity under 18 U.S.C. § 6003.230 Thus, even if biometric authentication
was determined to be an assertion of fact that became a link in the chain
of evidence necessary for prosecution, much like granting immunity for
the act of producing a memorized passcode, the government could grant
immunity for the act of authentication if the evidence was a foregone
conclusion.231
In short, although a passcode on a cell phone provides an additional
layer of protection from unwanted governmental searches, biometric
authentication seems to entirely remove this protection, which inadver-
tently affects Fifth Amendment rights. While some are quick to note that
biometric authentication provides better protection from hackers than
passcodes because biometrics are more unique than passcodes, they fail
to consider the protection from unwanted governmental intrusion.232
2. THE SLIM CHANCE THAT THE SELF-INCRIMINATION
PRIVILEGE WILL APPLY
While the analysis regarding biometric authentication’s impact on
the Fifth Amendment seems relatively simple, there are two specific fac-
tors that complicate the issue. First, in many personal media devices,
although biometric authentication minimizes the times the user needs to
enter the passcode, the passcode is nonetheless still running in the back-
ground. For example, with the iPhone 5s, biometric authentication can-
not be set up without first creating a passcode.233 Therefore, while the
actual authentication occurs via mere physical traits, authentication is
still linked to the passcode. It would not be surprising to hear the argu-
ment that, because the authentication is linked to a passcode, a finger-
print scan is akin to the defendant entering that passcode to unlock the
230. See id. at 38–46 (explaining the constitutionality of an order to compel production under
18 U.S.C. § 6002 after receiving a grant of immunity under § 6003). 18 U.S.C. § 6002 provides,
[w]henever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination,
to testify or provide other information in a proceeding . . . and the person presiding
over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this title, the
witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order
(or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other
information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a
prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with
the order.
231. See Brenner, supra note 211, at 537 (discussing how the ability to grant immunity for the
act of producing a passcode can overcome an invocation of the Fifth Amendment).
232. See Pagliery, supra note 158. But see Charlie Osborne, Apple iPhone Fingerprint Scanner
Raises Security Worries, ZDNET (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.zdnet.com/apple-iphone-finger
print-scanner-raises-security-worries-7000020767/ (if hackers are able to gain access, they gain
access to permanent data that cannot be changed like a passcode).
233. See supra note 180 (discussing how to set up Touch ID).
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phone. While the accused was technically compelled to exhibit a physi-
cal characteristic, the accused was arguably compelled to indirectly dis-
close knowledge of the passcode because the fingerprint is connected to
the passcode. Thus, unlike the cases where the Supreme Court has held
that compelling the suspect to be the source of physical evidence did not
violate the self-incrimination privilege,234 a court may consider biomet-
ric authentication differently. In those cases, the physical evidence was
not linked to any knowledge. The blood analysis in Schmerber,235 the
blouse modeling in Holt,236 the speech in Wade,237 and the handwriting
exemplar in Gilbert,238 all occurred without the defendant creating a
passcode committed to his and only his memory. Alternatively, an iris
scan or a fingerprint scan on a smartphone or laptop cannot occur with-
out the defendant creating a passcode committed to his and only his
memory. Further, in the aforementioned cases, the Supreme Court did
not base its decisions on whether the incriminating information was a
“foregone conclusion.”239
Additionally, unlike the consent directive in Doe that did not com-
municate any implicit or explicit factual assertions to constitute a testi-
monial communication,240 biometric authentication may communicate
an implicit factual assertion that the accused owns the smartphone or
laptop and the data therein.241 Should law enforcement then find incrim-
inating evidence within the smartphone or laptop, one could contend that
its submission at trial would violate the Fifth Amendment because the
purpose of authenticating the device was to obtain testimony from some-
one to prove that there was incriminating evidence—meeting the testi-
monial prong—and to communicate to the court that the defendant was
linked to the evidence—meeting the communicative prong.242 However,
234. See discussion supra Part II.A.
235. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
236. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
237. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
238. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
239. See United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Williams, J.,
dissenting) (noting how Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757, Holt, 218 U.S. 245, Wade, 388 U.S. 218, and
Gilbert, 388 U.S. 263, “do not rely on anything like the ‘foregone conclusion’ rationale; instead,
they find that such facts are not testimonial because they fit into the category of compulsion which
makes a suspect or accused the source of real or physical evidence”), aff’d, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
240. 487 U.S. 201, 215 (1988).
241. Contra id. at 218 (the only factual assertion that would be made if the banks produced
records in response to consent forms the petitioner signed would be the bank’s implicit assertion
that it believes the accounts to be the petitioner’s).
242. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 774 (Black, J., dissenting) (explaining how extracting blood
from the petitioner to determine if he was drunk had both a testimonial and a communicative
aspect even though it was merely an analysis of physical evidence). Justice Black opined that the
majority used a “very restrictive reading of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-
incrimination [particularly] on the words ‘testimonial’ and ‘communicative.’” Id. Justice Black
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this argument still faces an uphill battle. While the compelled act
(authentication) may implicitly assert that the smartphone is the
accused’s by unlocking the phone or laptop—just like it would by enter-
ing the correct passcode retrieved from memory—the compelled act
(authentication) makes the accused the source of physical evidence
instead of making the accused reveal the contents of his mind.243
Although the user is asserting the fact, “this is mine,” by being the
source of physical evidence, this argument has explicitly been
rejected.244
Second, some biometric authentication methods might actually be
able to reveal the contents of one’s mind. For example, consider speech
recognition. People are generally conscious of whether they speak
slowly or quickly, at what tone, and how they pronounce certain
words.245 Dissenting Judge Williams set forth a similar position in Hub-
bell, stating:
[I]n giving a voice sample, one also admits that one’s voice has vari-
ous characteristic idiosyncrasies—a non-obvious and incriminating
fact that the law allows the prosecutor to secure by compul-
sion. . . . One can, of course, discern a communicative element in the
pointed out the Court’s “rather labored explication” of these words, suggesting that “[t]hese words
are not models of clarity and precision,” and noted the Court’s inability to “find precedent in the
former opinions of this Court for using these particular words to limit the scope of the Fifth
Amendment’s protection.” Id. With the problems that biometric authentication may create
regarding the Fifth Amendment that will be discussed in Part V.C, the Supreme Court could end
up reconsidering Justice Black’s viewpoint.
243. See id. at 764 (“[T]he privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or
‘testimony,’ but . . . compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical
evidence’ does not violate it.”). Compare id. at 764–65 (a blood test was not a violation of the
privilege because it only made the accused the source of physical evidence), with In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d 1335, 1346 (11th Cir. 2012) (decrypting and producing hard
drive contents would violate the privilege because it would require a memorized decryption
password).
244. See Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 573–74, where the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Colombia acknowledged and dismissed this argument:
While it can be argued that the accused implicitly testified . . . that this is my blood
containing my unique DNA, that this is my face with all of its characteristic
idiosyncra[s]ies, that this is my body with a particular shape and size which fits into
this blouse—that testimony was irrelevant to the Fifth Amendment inquiry because
it required no act of will on his part as to what he would communicate. The same
reasoning applies to a compelled submission to fingerprint analysis. The suspect can
be said to be communicating that this is my hand and it contains five fingerprints
unique to my person, but in reality the individual has merely been compelled to
make himself available as a “source of ‘real or physical evidence.’” . . . For
purposes of Fifth Amendment analysis, it is dispositive that the government has no
need to rely upon the witness’s truthtelling to secure the evidence it seeks.
245. See generally TOASTMASTERS INT’L, YOUR SPEAKING VOICE (2011), available at http://
www.toastmasters.org/199-YourSpeakingVoice (discussing how to change the way one speaks
with pitch, rate, and volume alterations).
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giving of a voice sample: a person commanded to speak implicitly
says, “This is the way I sound when I speak.”246
If an accused had a phone that used voice recognition for authentication,
it would analyze these factors to identify the user.247 Thus, the accused
could easily change the rate, tone, pitch, and pronunciation while
attempting to authenticate the device to consciously prevent authentica-
tion.248 Alternatively, consciously speaking in the same manner in which
one normally does might be analogous to revealing the contents of one’s
mind.249 It would then follow that compelling voice recognition would
be analogous to compelling a suspect to reveal something testimonial in
nature, which some courts have held to violate the privilege against self-
incrimination.250 However, Wade suggests that this argument would
probably fail.251 One could assume that the accused in Wade was also
conscious of his speech pattern when being compelled to speak for iden-
tification, and since the Supreme Court still considered his speech not
“testimonial in nature,” a court would probably also consider speech for
voice recognition not “testimonial in nature.”
Additionally, the Chavez decision poses yet another hurdle for bio-
metric authentication to overcome before it could be considered a viola-
tion of the self-incrimination privilege.252 Post-Chavez, some scholars
have suggested that it is difficult for a defendant to demonstrate that
requests for passwords by police even have a compulsion element
because police “lack legal authority to compel the individual to say any-
thing.”253 The argument would follow that because biometric authentica-
tion provides easy access to a phone or laptop without police having to
“compel” the suspect to provide the password, the compulsion element
246. 167 F.3d at 598 (Williams, J., dissenting).
247. See NSTCS SPEAKER RECOGNITION, supra note 168.
248. See generally Donald B. Fiedler, Acting Effectively in Court: Using Dramatic Techniques,
25 CHAMPION 18, 20–22 (2001) (discussing how attorneys can change the way they speak in the
courtroom); TOASTMASTERS INT’L, supra note 245 (suggesting how one can change the way he or
she speaks).
249. Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966) (a test that measures changes in
body functioning could be testimonial in nature).
250. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d 1335, 1346 (11th Cir. 2012)
(decryption would require the appellant to use the contents of his mind); United States v.
Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 669 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (the defendant would have to use his
mental processes to reveal his password).
251. 388 U.S. 218, 222–23 (1967) (compelled speech is not testimonial in nature if the speech
was to be used solely as an identifying characteristic and not to admit guilt).
252. See 538 U.S. 760, 766–67 (2003) (rejecting the assertion that the phrase “criminal case”
in the self-incrimination clause includes police interrogations without the initiation of legal
proceedings).
253. Gershowitz, supra note 95, at 1168. But see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461
(1966) (noting that compulsion to speak during police questioning may be greater than in courts
where there are impartial observers).
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in password requests would disappear.254 Then, because authentication
would occur without having to compel production of the password via a
subpoena, one could contend that biometric authentication could not
implicate the privilege because the compulsion aspect would never be
present. However, this argument ignores the fact that in Chavez the gov-
ernment never filed criminal charges.255 In a case where an accused had
criminal charges filed against him, the accused could at least try to argue
that biometric authentication during interrogation violated the Fifth
Amendment.256
Further, a consideration of the self-incrimination clause’s history
indicates that the privilege is not merely a “trial right.”257 First, the
clause is in the wrong amendment to only be considered a post-indict-
ment trial right.258 Second, historical cases considered confessions and
statements made to police while in custody prior to trial.259 And, third,
the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that “all the principles embodied
in the privilege apply to informal compulsion exerted by law-enforce-
ment officers during in-custody questioning.”260 Therefore, while the
characterization of the self-incrimination privilege as a “trial right”
poses yet another hurdle to jump in order to successfully advance a
claim that biometric authentication implicates the privilege, the possibil-
ity does remain open.
In sum, while one could argue that biometric authentication is “tes-
timonial in nature” and may implicate the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, the arguments are a stretch. Although passcode case law remains
somewhat unclear, biometric authentication appears to pose a simpler
analysis, suggesting that a user joining the “Biometric Revolution” has
less ability to “invoke the Fifth” than a traditional passcode user.
C. Eroding the Fifth Amendment
Biometric authentication is exciting, more convenient, and arguably
254. See discussion supra Part II.C (discussing how police have to get the suspect to
voluntarily provide the passcode or subpoena the passcode if the suspect does not voluntarily
provide it).
255. 538 U.S. at 764.
256. See id. at 766 (“[A] ‘criminal case’ at the very least requires the initiation of legal
proceedings.”). Indeed, the Supreme Court stated, “[t]he text of the Self-Incrimination Clause
simply cannot support the . . . view that the mere use of compulsive questioning, without more,
violates the Constitution.” Id. at 767.
257. See Davies, supra note 5, at 1018 (characterizing the claim that the privilege against self-
incrimination is a trial right, as “acontextual, ahistorical, and essentially arbitrary”).
258. See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text (discussing how post-indictment
procedural rights are contained within the Sixth Amendment).
259. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532
(1897).
260. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461.
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safer than the traditional passcode authentication that most people are
probably familiar with. However, biometric authentication may limit the
opportunities in which an individual may invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination. While the National Science and Technology Subcom-
mittee on Biometric and Identity Management noted the importance of
using the technology “to support national needs while being considerate
of the public’s social and privacy concerns,”261 few seem to have con-
sidered its legal implications. Unfortunately, biometric authentication
may erode the constitutional protection that traditional passcodes have
provided and also create concerns for future technologies.
First, biometric authentication ultimately creates two general cate-
gories of laptop, tablet, and cell phone users: those who are protected
and those who are not. Users who retain an older device or decide to
forgo biometric authentication retain the ability to refuse to provide a
passcode based on the privilege against self-incrimination. Alternatively,
those who purchase the latest smartphone or laptop and utilize biometric
authentication no longer have this ability because biometric authentica-
tion likely does not implicate the privilege. As previously discussed,
because biometric authentication removes the need to ever compel an
arrestee to produce a passcode,262 law enforcement will always have the
ability to access devices once they obtain a search warrant. Upon finding
incriminating evidence, a defendant would have little success in claim-
ing that the government violated his or her privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. Meanwhile, traditional passcode users could argue that any
incriminating evidence found as a result of compelled passcode produc-
tion violates their privilege against self-incrimination. Logically, two
groups of people emerge: those who reject biometric authentication and
retain the ability to invoke the Fifth Amendment, and those who relin-
quish that ability by signing on the dotted line for the latest mobile con-
sumer device and choosing to utilize biometric authentication.263
261. See NSTCS FACE RECOGNITION, supra note 159 (regarding the use of facial recognition
technology at the 2001 Super Bowl).
262. See discussion supra Part V.B.1. But cf. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit at 12, Riley v. California, No.
13-132 (U.S. June 25, 2014) (where in United States v. Wurie, No. 13-212, which was
consolidated in the Riley v. California decision, the respondent noted that “[t]he newest models
[of cell phones] use biometrics and other methods to control access. Whether an individual could
be required to provide access to officers who have seized his/her phone is yet another issue not yet
raised or addressed in the decisions to date.”).
263. Interestingly, in Riley, Justice Alito explained a similar problem regarding the Fourth
Amendment that may arise from the Court’s decision. See No. 13-132, slip op. at 4–5 (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (discussing how the Court’s holding “favors
information in digital form over information in hard-copy form”). Justice Alito posed a
hypothetical in which two suspects are arrested, one with a hard-copy form of a cell phone bill on
his person and one with a cell phone, and pointed out that, under the Court’s holding prohibiting
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Creating a distinction between the ability to compel individuals to
disclose passwords in the form of fingerprints versus alphanumeric form
erodes the basic premise that everyone is afforded Fifth Amendment
protection—the distinction actually affords less protection to those who
embrace the new technology.264 Considering that the Fifth Amend-
ment’s fundamental purpose was to preserve “an adversary system of
criminal justice,”265 to imply that the government can skirt its burdens
with those who accept technological advancements is patently unjust.
Moreover, these two groups will likely exist longer than one may
expect. While some may find themselves eager to embrace biometric
authentication for the excitement, convenience, and purported security,
the ability to imitate biometric factors because they are not secrets com-
mitted to memory may make others more reluctant.266 Some security
experts caution that the convenience of biometric authentication on
smartphones and other personal devices “could become a hacking trea-
sure trove, granting [hackers] access to permanent data which cannot be
deleted or changed.”267 Because the physical elements cannot be
changed like a traditional passcode, there is concern about putting such
permanent data on a phone that can easily be stolen, lost, or hacked
into.268 Thus, while some view biometric authentication on personal
devices as a reliable convenience, others may be wary of relying on
biometrics, or may simply just abandon the technology if it proves to be
too unreliable.269 Consequently, this disparate protection will probably
warrantless cell phone searches incident to arrest, police could seize and examine the phone bill
for incriminating evidence without a warrant but not the cell phone. Id. at 5. Thus, the suspect
with the cell phone would have greater Fourth Amendment protection than the suspect with the
hard-copy phone bill. See id. The fact that at least one Justice considered this idea of disparate
protection but did not see a “workable alternative,” supports the proposition that, as technology
advances, Constitutional protection will vary from person to person. See id. (acknowledging that
“the Court’s approach leads to anomalies”).
264. See Larkin, supra note 17, at 270 (“Compelling some defendants to surrender their
‘passwords’ in the form of a fingerprint, but allowing others to keep an alphanumeric password
secret, creates an arbitrary distinction in a way that ignores the purpose of the Fifth Amendment’s
important protections.”). This problem compounds when considering the vast amount of personal
information modern cell phones hold. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing how
much information modern cell phones hold).
265. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976).
266. See Paul Rubens, Biometric Authentication: How It Works, ESECURITY PLANET (Aug. 17,
2012), http://www.esecurityplanet.com/trends/biometric-authentication-how-it-works.html. For
example, a hacker could present a photograph to fool a facial recognition system or play a
recording of a voice to a voice recognition system. See id.
267. Osborne, supra note 232 (quoting an interview by Der Spiegel with John Caspar,
Hamburg Comm’r for Data Prot. & Freedom of Info.).
268. See id.
269. Biometric authentication’s accuracy is measured “by two statistics: False Non Match Rate
(FNMR) and False Match Rate (FMR).” Rubens, supra note 266. FNMR refers to “how often a
biometric is not matched to the template when it should be,” resulting in prohibited authentication
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be an issue that will not quickly cure itself. In short, the disparate protec-
tion is a significant concern that will likely exist long enough to force
courts or legislatures to address the issue.270
Second, the ability to encrypt data via biometric authentication
means that users who do so probably have no Fifth Amendment protec-
tion regarding that data. If a person can be compelled to unlock a phone
via biometric authentication because it does not reveal the contents of
his mind, a person can be compelled to produce encrypted data because
it also does not reveal the contents of his mind. Undoubtedly, the news
that the National Security Agency (“NSA”) has been collecting phone
records generated much conversation regarding privacy concerns.271
Now, in addition to the traditional hackers and identity thieves, people
may worry about the government gaining access to their personal data.
Some suggest that encrypting data on smartphones is one way to prevent
this,272 and, because biometric authentication allows the user to decrypt
documents without having to remember a password, users may be more
likely to adopt this method.
While it is unclear as to whether compelled production of a pass-
code or encrypted data violates the privilege against self-incrimination,
at least a traditional passcode user has some hope that the government
cannot compel production.273 Biometric authentication removes that
hope and creates unequal protection amongst encryption users. The cur-
rent circuit-split on the issue of compelled production of a password or
encrypted data suggests that where the information is a foregone conclu-
sion, compelled production does not violate the Fifth Amendment.274
Thus, in situations where the information is not a foregone conclusion,
compelled production would violate the Fifth Amendment. Conse-
quently, in cases where the information within a laptop or cell phone is
not a foregone conclusion, a person using an older laptop or cell phone
by the correct person, while FMR refers to “how often a false biometric is matched (and
authentication is allowed) when it shouldn’t be,” resulting in authentication by the wrong person.
Id.
270. See Riley v. California, No. 13-132, slip op. at 6 (U.S. June 25, 2014) (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (explaining how modern cell phones
“implicate[ ] very sensitive privacy interests that this Court is poorly positioned to understand and
evaluate,” and that “[l]egislatures, elected by the people, are in a better position than we are to
assess and respond to the changes that have already occurred and those that almost certainly will
take place in the future”).
271. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon
Customers Daily, THE GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/
nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order.
272. See McDowell, supra note 110.
273. See generally Gershowitz, supra note 95 (discussing the benefits of password protecting
cell phones); see also supra notes 95–104 and accompanying text.
274. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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without biometric authentication capabilities could keep his information
private, while the person with a brand new laptop or smartphone could
be forced to reveal his information. Effectively, those who choose to lag
behind and resist technological advances may be afforded stronger con-
stitutional protection. Although this presents the same disparate protec-
tion concerns as previously discussed, biometric authentication will
impact not only traditional every-day passcode issues, but also more
complex encryption issues.
Third, the privilege to be free from self-incrimination will actually
provide less protection, if any, to situations where biometric authentica-
tion provides the government with more reliable proof that the accused
has knowledge, possession, and control over the incriminating evidence.
As previously discussed, while compelled biometric authentication may
assert that the device and the files contained within it are the accused’s,
the compelled act (authentication) merely makes the accused the source
of physical evidence, and is therefore not compelled testimony like pro-
ducing a passcode committed to memory.275 If the government cannot
show its independent knowledge of the accused’s knowledge and control
over the incriminating evidence—without compelled testimony—the
evidence is not a “foregone conclusion,” and the self-incrimination priv-
ilege applies; thus, the accused is protected from being compelled to be
a witness against himself by revealing the contents of his mind.276 If
biometric authentication merely makes the accused the source of physi-
cal evidence and is not considered “compelled testimony,” the self-
incrimination privilege would not apply,277 and the government would
never have to show that the evidence is a “foregone conclusion.”278
Compelling an accused to reveal a passcode, however, could be consid-
ered “compelled testimony” because it forces the accused to reveal the
contents of his mind; unless the government can show that the evidence
is a “foregone conclusion,” the self-incrimination privilege likely
applies.279 Problematically, though, compelling an accused to enter a
memorized passcode may actually be less reliable proof that the person
has knowledge of and control over any incriminating evidence found
within that device because passcodes can easily be shared with others,
275. See discussion supra Part V.B.
276. E.g., United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43–45 (2000).
277. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966) (compelling the accused to be the
source of physical evidence is not “compelled testimony” to violate the privilege).
278. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43–45 (when the government relies on the accused to confirm
the existence and authenticity of the evidence through compelled testimony, the evidence is not a
“foregone conclusion,” and the self-incrimination privilege applies).
279. See id.; In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d 1335, 1345–46, 1349 (11th
Cir. 2012).
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whereas biometrics cannot.280 For example, John could tell Jane the
password to certain encrypted files located on a computer; if Jane were
to then decrypt the particular data by producing the password, it would
not necessarily prove that Jane had knowledge of or control over that
data. On the other hand, John could not share his fingerprint or iris with
Jane, so if John were to decrypt the data with his fingerprint or iris, it
would almost certainly prove that John had knowledge of and control
over that data. If the government could not show that the incriminating
evidence was a “foregone conclusion,” the privilege would provide pro-
tection in the password situation, where it would actually be less reliable
that the person had knowledge of and control over the incriminating
evidence.281
Alternatively, with biometric authentication, where one can practi-
cally be certain that the authenticator has knowledge of and control over
the data therein because the authenticating factor cannot be shared,
duplicated, or hacked,282 the privilege would not afford any protection
because the accused would merely be the source of physical evidence.283
Consequently, the self-incrimination privilege would afford more pro-
tection when it is less certain that the compelled individual has knowl-
edge of and control over the incriminating evidence. If the self-
incrimination privilege protects an accused from being compelled to be a
witness against himself by producing incriminating testimony,284 it is
troubling that an accused may actually have less constitutional protec-
tion where the compelled act of production more reliably confirms that
the person has knowledge of and control over the incriminating
evidence.
Fourth, the conclusion that biometric authentication does not impli-
cate the privilege to be free from self-incrimination poses serious con-
cerns for future technologies. Assuming this conclusion is correct, what
will happen if and when innovation creates a device that can read a
280. See Rubens, supra note 266 (“The main benefit of using a biometric authentication factor
instead of a physical token is that biometrics can’t easily be lost, stolen, hacked, duplicated, or
shared. They are also resistant to social engineering attacks . . . .”). Thus, it may be less reliable to
assume a person owns data after he enters a passcode than it would be if the person uses
biometrics to unlock the data. Even the Supreme Court has noted the value of DNA analysis
regarding identification. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1971 (2013) (“An individual’s
identity is more than just his name or Social Security number, and the government’s interest in
identification goes beyond ensuring that the proper name is typed on the indictment.”).
281. See supra notes 277–78 and accompanying text.
282. See Rubens, supra note 266 (discussing the benefits of biometric authentication compared
to passwords).
283. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764–65 (1966) (the privilege does not afford
protection to situations where the accused is merely compelled to be the source of physical
evidence).
284. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976).
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person’s mind?285 By analogy, if the device were to scan brain activity,
would this be analogous to the individual revealing the contents of his
mind, thereby implicating the self-incrimination privilege?286 Or would
this merely be akin to a display of physical characteristics, therefore not
implicating the self-incrimination privilege?287 Based on the previously
discussed precedent, it seems likely that the Supreme Court would sim-
ply consider this an analysis of physical characteristics.288 If so, then the
Fifth Amendment privilege to be free from self-incrimination would
essentially disappear because the government would never have to com-
pel any knowledge or testimony. Nonetheless, it is clear that this tech-
nology has the ability to impact our constitutional rights.
So, what should users do? Should users take a chance and jump
into the “Biometric Revolution”? Or should they lag behind, resisting
technological change, while becoming more and more wary of what the
government might lawfully be able to do? Some have suggested that due
to the murky interplay of biometric authentication and the privilege to be
free from self-incrimination, it may be better to continue relying on
numeric passcodes until the law becomes clearer.289 However, this may
be impracticable, or even impossible, as the demand to stay current with
the ever-changing technology remains a strong societal force. Because
there is no easy answer, arguably the best option is to use both biomet-
285. See Alan S. Cowen et al., Neural Portraits of Perception: Reconstructing Face Images
from Evoked Brain Activity, 94 NEUROIMAGE 12, 12–13 (2014) (reporting how recent
neuroimaging advances have allowed researchers to reconstruct face images from brain activity);
see also Karen Weintraub, Scientists Explore Possibilities of Mind Reading, USA TODAY (Apr.
22, 2014, 9:26 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/04/22/mind-reading-brain-scans/
7747831/ (discussing how some researchers believe thoughts may be readable someday).
286. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000) (The privilege applied because the
respondent was compelled to “make extensive use of ‘the contents of his own mind’ in identifying
the hundreds of documents responsive to the request in the subpoena. . . . The assembly of those
documents was like telling an inquisitor the combination to a wall safe, not like being forced to
surrender the key to a strongbox.”).
287. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764–65 (“compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the
source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate” the privilege).
288. See cases cited supra note 8. However, in Schmerber, the Supreme Court noted,
[s]ome tests seemingly directed to obtain “physical evidence,” for example, lie
detector tests measuring changes in body function during interrogation, may
actually be directed to eliciting responses which are essentially testimonial. To
compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort will be made to determine
his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether willed or not,
is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment. Such situations call to
mind the principle that the protection of the privilege “is as broad as the mischief
against which it seeks to guard.”
384 U.S. at 764 (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892)).
289. See Kaufman, supra note 17, at 41 (“[I]t may be safer to rely, at least in part, on
memorized encryption keys unless and until more favorable law or technology evolves.”).
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rics and a passcode on personal devices if possible.290 That way, the user
not only has legal protection with the passcode, but also security protec-
tion with the biometrics. But how feasible is this? Not very, considering
one major advantage of biometric authentication is that it avoids having
to remember yet another passcode. Further, most biometric authentica-
tion technologies only offer the biometric method up front; it is not until
the biometric method fails that in some devices the passcode method
then becomes available.291 Should the biometrics match in the first
place, the device would be unlocked and the user would not even have
the option to enter the passcode. While ideal in theory, using both bio-
metrics and a passcode is likely an unrealistic option.
One option is fairly obvious, yet complex: legislative action. For
example, lobbying the Federal Communications Committee (“FCC”), or
the United States Department of Commerce, may be successful in creat-
ing laws requiring smartphone manufacturers and operating system
developers to at least provide the option to utilize both biometrics and
passcodes before a device can be “unlocked.”292 That way, users can
choose to authenticate with both methods, one or the other, or none at
all. Unfortunately, because of the benefits biometric authentication pro-
vides, it is unlikely that manufacturers would provide this without some
kind of regulation.293
A second, more obvious, and more immediate option is relatively
simple: users will have to choose what they value more—convenient
authentication and better hacker protection, or traditional memorization
and more assured legal protection. Unfortunately, due to the lack of any
specific biometric authentication precedent and the lack of specific pre-
cedent from the Supreme Court on compelled production of encrypted
data, this might be the only option a user has. Ultimately, it appears to
come down to a “value and risk” balancing game: what does a user
value more and how big of a risk-taker is that user?
290. See Hoffman, supra note 17 (“Here’s an easy fix: give users the option to unlock their
phones with a fingerprint plus something the user knows.”); Rubens, supra note 266 (“A better
method is to adopt a two-factor authentication system.”).
291. See, e.g., supra note 180 (discussing Touch ID).
292. The FCC is the United States governmental agency responsible for federal
communications law and regulation. See What We Do, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, http://www.fcc.
gov/what-we-do (last visited Aug. 9, 2014). Another option is the National Institute of Standards
and Technology, which is the U.S. Department of Commerce agency that provides research
services on standards, technical regulations, and conformity assessment procedures for non-
agricultural products. See National Center for Standards and Certification Information, NIST,
http://www.nist.gov/director/sco/ncsci/index.cfm (last updated May 15, 2014).
293. See generally Pagliery, supra note 158 (discussing how fingerprint scanning is safer than
typing in a password and more convenient because the user no longer has to memorize numerous
username and password combinations).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The current state of the Fifth Amendment privilege to be free from
self-incrimination is unclear enough as it is. On one hand, precedent
suggests that biometric authentication would not implicate the privilege
to be free from self-incrimination because it is an analysis of physical
characteristics. On the other hand, the circuit split regarding compelled
disclosure of passwords and production of encrypted data complicates
the issue, especially if consumers begin encrypting data on their
smartphones and laptops via biometrics and as technology improves and
reveals more about the user than pure physical characteristics. Undoubt-
edly, the state of the Fifth Amendment privilege to be free from self-
incrimination will only get cloudier with the “Biometric Revolution.”
While biometric authentication provides users with stronger hacker and
identity theft protection,294 it likely removes constitutional protection.295
To continue technological progress, improve security, and make
authentication and identification more convenient for the user, biometric
authentication certainly must be embraced. Nonetheless, it is important
to keep in mind how technological advancements may impact constitu-
tional rights and to do everything possible to uphold those rights. While
many users may opt to take the legal risk and jump into the “Biometric
Revolution,” it should be their choice to potentially relinquish their con-
stitutional right by doing so. Ultimately, the ability to utilize both bio-
metrics and memorized passcodes to access personal devices is arguably
the best option.296 In the age of increased security concerns combined
with the lust for the latest technological invention, this option would
provide users with the heightened security they desire, the latest-and-
greatest technology, and a protected Fifth Amendment privilege.
Now reconsider the hypothetical posed at the outset. Would com-
pelled authentication via a fingerprint reader on a suspect’s smartphone
violate the suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege to be free from self-
incrimination? Likely not. In that case, the suspect would undoubtedly
wish he or she was a member of the group that rejected biometric
authentication and, instead, continued to shoulder the burden of memo-
rizing a passcode. But what will happen when that group no longer has
294. See id. (discussing how fingerprint scanning provides better protection against hackers);
Whittaker iPhone, supra note 186 (explaining how fingerprint scanning helps prevent identity
theft).
295. In considering DNA in regards to searches, while ultimately determining a DNA analysis
was a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court noted, “science can
always progress further, and those progressions may have Fourth Amendment consequences . . . .”
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013). Indeed, biometric authentication may be a good
example of science’s progressions having Fifth Amendment consequences.
296. See supra note 290.
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the option to carry this burden? Precedent indicates that people will sim-
ply have less constitutional protection in testimonial evidence that may
be contained in their mobile consumer devices. Until then, the two
groups—those who embrace the “Biometric Revolution” and those who
do not—will have disparate constitutional protection. Either way, bio-
metric authentication poses significant Fifth Amendment concerns.
